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Samandrag 
Denne oppgåva tek føre seg Virginia Woolf si oppfatning av kreativitet, med utgangspunkt i 
androgyniomgrepet ho lanserer i essayet A Room of One’s Own frå 1928. Denne teksten 
diskuterer vilkåra for skaparevne, med særleg omsyn til kvinner og litteratur, over fem 
kapittel, før essayisten i det sjette og siste kapitlet kjem med ei oppmoding til alle som ønskjer 
å skrive om å ‟gløyme‟ seg sjølv og kjønnsidentiteten sin, for slik å gjere plass til 
eit ‟androgynt sinn‟. Denne utsegna har vore opphav til ei mengd ulike lesingar i ein 
heterogen debatt om Woolf sitt kreativitetskonsept. Ein gjennomgåande tendens sidan 1970-
talet har likevel vore det feministiske perspektivet med fokus på det kjønnsdualistiske i Woolf 
sin androgyne ‟visjon‟. Eit utval av lesingar med feministisk innfallsvinkel presenterer eg i 
resepsjonskapitlet som kjem først i denne oppgåva. Tanken bak dette kapitlet er å gi eit 
innblikk i etablerte oppfatningar samstundes som eg gjer tydeleg min eigen posisjon i høve til 
desse, som representerer ei bakhtinsk oppfatning av kreativ androgyni som dialog. Det 
dialogiske prinsippet inneber eit gjensidig avhengig høve mellom sjølv og andre som Bakhtin 
sidestiller med den estetiske spenninga mellom forfattar og helt. Mi lesing tolkar det 
essayisten kallar eit mentalt samarbeid mellom mann og kvinne som ein metafor for den 
etiske og estetiske aktiviteten mellom sjølvet og den andre, som i følgje Bakhtin må sjåast 
som eit allmennmenneskeleg gyldig prinsipp. Over dei neste to kapitla presenterer eg lesingar 
av romanane Mrs Dalloway og To the Lighthouse, med fokus på relasjonane mellom 
karakterane som meditasjonar over kreativitet. Medan Woolf sine tekstar er polyfone rom 
utan eitt dominant perspektiv, følgjer eg ei meir eller mindre klar linje frå Elizabeth Dalloway 
i Mrs Dalloway, via Lily Briscoe i To the Lighthouse og til Mary Carmichael i  A Room of 
One’s Own, med omsyn til korleis dei kan seiast å uttrykkje skaparkraft som eit androgynt, 
dialogisk prinsipp. 
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Preface 
Discussing “[w]hat conditions are necessary for the creation of works of art” (AROO: 27), the 
voice speaking in Virginia Woolf‟s 1928 essay A Room of One’s Own reflects that “a great 
mind is androgynous [...] a mind that is purely masculine cannot create, any more than a mind 
that is purely feminine” (AROO: 97). This idea seems to originate in the essayist‟s observation 
of a man and a woman sharing a taxi; “the sight of the two people getting into the taxi and the 
satisfaction it gave me made me also ask whether there are two sexes in the mind 
corresponding to the two sexes in the body, and whether they also require to be united in 
order to get complete satisfaction and happiness?” (AROO: 96). Pondering how “[s]ome 
collaboration has to take place in the mind between the woman and the man before the art of 
creation can be accomplished” (AROO: 103), in order for the mind to be “fully fertilized” 
(AROO: 97), the narrator concludes that, indeed, “[i]t is fatal to be a man or a woman pure 
and simple; one must be woman-manly or man-womanly” (AROO: 102). She thinks to herself, 
however, that “it would be well to test what one meant by man-womanly, and conversely by 
woman-manly, by pausing and looking at a book or two” (AROO: 97).  
 The present thesis reads the this last quote as an invitation to investigate Woolf‟s 
concept of creativity as it is conveyed in three of her books, taking as its point of departure the 
questions raised above about the androgynous mind. I have chosen to include the novels Mrs 
Dalloway and To the Lighthouse in my discussion of Woolf‟s negotiation of a topic that 
followed her over time; as both these novels explore various „visions‟ of creativity through 
different characters and how they relate to each other. Taking into account the speaker‟s 
statement that “books continue each other, in spite of our habit of judging them separately” 
(AROO: 79), the following chapters read the three texts as ideationally and thematically 
connected through a sustained meditation on the conditions of creativity. This implies a 
 
 
3 
 
methodological approach of treating the texts as participants engaging in a conversation about 
androgyny.  
Presented as a creative ideal, Woolf‟s concept of androgyny raises questions about 
artistic creativity as related to sex and gender as well as the premises for the human ability to 
create. The etymological basis and meaning of androgyny as a “[u]nion of sexes; 
hermaphroditism” (OED) has commonly translated in critics‟ minds to a compound of 
masculine and feminine characteristics, leading many to focus on Woolfian androgyny as a 
concept closely tied to sexual categories. As much as I value the mainly feminist perspective 
from which Woolfian androgyny has been read over the past few decades as both necessary 
and productive, I find that it has left out some important aspects and thus overlooked a wider, 
ethical potential latent in the vision of the aesthetically productive, androgynous mind. 
Positioning myself against rather literal readings of androgyny as a matter of sexual 
distinctions, I understand the androgynous mind more as a metaphor of a creative state that is 
also fundamentally ethical. For a perspective on Woolf that is largely unexplored, I shall turn 
to Mikhail Bakhtin and his theories of dialogue and dialogism, paying specific attention to his 
thoughts of self and other in the essay “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”.  
Founding his architectonics on the perceptual difference between self and other, 
Bakhtin treats the latter connection as the aesthetic relation between author and hero. 
Dialogue, understood as the recognition of otherness and the interchangeability between self 
and other, Bakhtin sees as a “necessary principle” that has the “creative, productive character” 
(AA: 5) of an “aesthetic event” (AA: 20). With reference to Bakhtinian dialogue, my thesis 
defends a more extensive definition of artistic androgyny as an aesthetic as well as ethical 
position, by reading the “rhythmical order” (AROO: 95) of the man and the woman‟s 
collaboration in the mind as metaphorical of the “necessary principle” by which the self and 
the other engage in creative dialogue. The method I employ to demonstrate the productivity of 
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this reading combines the dialogical view of human relations with the essayist‟s statement that 
“books have a way of influencing each other” (AROO: 107), juxtaposing and conjoining 
Woolf‟s works in an intertextual whole in which their individual views enter into a complex 
conversation about the dialogical aspects of androgyny as a creative concept. Their meeting 
points are in the spaces between them, summoning and connecting the texts in a dialogue 
realising their creative potential through character relations within and across the works.  
 Bakhtin‟s view of human relations as essentially dialogical and thus creative events 
has inspired me to focus specifically on Woolf‟s character connections in my enquiry into the 
dynamics of artistic androgyny. I must, however, emphasise that my employment of the 
notion of dialogue throughout this thesis is not consistently Bakhtinian; I use the term 
somewhat freely to explain and open up for what I see as the expansive potential of the 
androgynous vision as it is presented in A Room of One’s Own. Thus, I read the associations 
between the characters as meditations on creativity as a dialogical relation. This is the premise 
for my discussion of the creative efforts of the characters; although not all of them have 
explicitly articulated artistic visions, their various ventures into the world can be considered 
as aesthetic projects.  
There is already a vast amount of criticism considering Clarissa Dalloway‟s party-
giving as a form of „social art‟. In Chapter Two, I read the novel as centred around one 
woman‟s effort “to combine; to create” (MD: 134) an ethical as well as aesthetical whole by 
using the specific social arena of the party to reach some deeper dimension of reality in which 
all the separate parts come together on a creative, dialogical level. It may be, however, that 
some parts remain separate, such as Clarissa‟s daughter Elizabeth, being confined to a role in 
which she cannot grow out of her position as a beautiful poplar tree (MD: 147). Clarissa‟s aim 
of creating harmony out of people‟s different „visions‟ thus reveals itself as problematic. 
Chapter Three shows how Lily Briscoe‟s explicitly artistic vision reflects both Clarissa‟s 
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effort to combine and Elizabeth‟s wish to escape the restraint that her mother‟s vision 
represents to her development of „a vision of her own‟. Like Elizabeth, Lily strives to position 
herself against a motherly figure, struggling to articulate Mrs. Ramsay‟s presence, then 
absence, in paint on her canvas. Lily‟s aesthetic, however, reaches further in terms of 
allowing people space for their otherness and thus comes closer to the androgynous mind that 
is “resonant and porous”, that “transmits emotion without impediment” and is “naturally 
creative, incandescent and undivided” (AROO: 97). These are characteristics of the 
androgynous kind of writing that Mary Carmichael represents, and for which Elizabeth and 
Lily may be said to pave the way. There goes a dialogical line from Elizabeth‟s vague creative 
effort contemplating how “[s]igns were interchanged” and how the “perpetual movement” of 
clouds rhythmically strikes light and darkness to the earth, via Lily‟s struggle to portray an 
other as well as herself through some “relations of masses, of light and shadows” (TTL: 59), 
to the essayist‟s explicit ideal for the creation of works of art, enabling an “incandescent” 
state of writing.  
Both Chapters Two and Three position themselves against other, intellectually 
complex critical perspectives. My aim in accounting for these perspectives has been to 
explain my own position in relation to more established approaches, an objective which 
inevitably has not allowed for a full exploration of other critical perceptions of Woolf‟s 
concept of creative androgyny. To show how my own reading relates to and departs from 
other, mostly feminist approaches, I have found it pertinent to include a reception chapter 
introducing a range of selected perspectives dating from the time of the essay‟s publication 
and to the present. The next pages will lay the ground for the argument in the proceeding 
chapters, and the consideration of the androgynous mind as an ethical as well as aesthetic 
experience going beyond the issues of sex and gender.   
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Chapter One  
The Reception of A Room of One’s Own 
Discussing the literary achievements of the fictional writer “Mary Carmichael”, the speaking 
subject of Virginia Woolf's 1928 essay A Room of One’s Own applauds how “[Carmichael] 
mastered the first great lesson; she wrote as a woman, but as a woman who has forgotten that 
she is a woman, so that her pages were full of that curious sexual quality which comes only 
when sex is unconscious of itself” (AROO: 92). The section on Mary Carmichael is found in 
the fifth of the essay‟s total of six chapters, and is preceded by four chapters debating the 
topic of “Women and Fiction” and attempting to explain the absence of women writers 
through history. The focus of these first chapters is the historical and social position of 
women, and the main argument seems to be that women have not had “a dog‟s chance” 
(AROO: 106) to aspire in any creative field due to their social submission to men, the 
domestic duties laid upon their shoulders, and last but not least, their lack of a room of their 
own. Significantly, the narrator chooses to exemplify the conditions having prevented females 
from developing artistically in the fictional sister of Shakespeare, “called Judith, let us say” 
(AROO: 48). 
 
“The Androgynous Mind” as a Creative Ideal 
Also significant is the first-person narrator‟s own, nameless self: “„I‟ is only a convenient 
term for somebody who has no real being” (AROO: 6), or rather, a multi-named identity: “call 
me Mary Beton, Mary Seton, Mary Carmichael, or by any name you please - it is not a matter 
of any importance” (AROO: 7). The unsettled nature of the narrator may be said to point to 
the last chapter of A Room of One’s Own, in which she presents her idea of how women with 
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literary ambitions should go about to succeed as writers, defending what she sees as the ideal 
and necessary mental state for creating; “the androgynous mind” (AROO: 97). The last term in 
particular formed the basis for one of the main controversies concerning Woolf‟s essay. 
Theorists and feminist scholars such as Elaine Showalter, Toril Moi, Jane Marcus and Rachel 
Bowlby have all responded in different ways to Woolf‟s concept of androgyny and its 
implications as regards the relationship between sex, gender and artistic creativity. This 
chapter will present some of the most significant views in the debate. 
 
Early Reception 
The immediate critical reception of A Room of One’s Own was on the whole good, in the 
sense that many critics seemed to read it as charming, stylistically delightful and politically 
inoffensive. The general focus in the early reviews was on the essay‟s light, chattery tone 
rather than the social critique inherent in her text, leading one critic to ask “what matters her 
argument provided she keeps on writing books like this?” (New York World, 29 October 1929, 
15; in Rosenman 16). Whether deliberately or not, most contemporary critics tended to 
overlook or miss the essay‟s irony and social engagement in favour of a concentration on its 
style and „conversational‟ quality. Moreover, where the political messages were picked up 
and commented upon, they were sometimes misunderstood and read contrary to the meaning 
of the argument in question. An example of this is Arnold Bennett‟s misreading and 
applauding of Woolf‟s ironic cliché that “[w]omen are hard on women” (AROO: 109). 
Woolf‟s narrative technique, with its shifts and interruptions, was also seen as a sign of the 
author‟s lacking literary skills and ability to focus, rather than exemplifying the distractions 
and disturbances known to those who have no room of their own.  
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Early Feminist Criticism: Showalter’s Condemnation of Androgyny as Escape   
The essay‟s focus on gender was not taken seriously as a debating point until the 1970s, when 
a new approach to literature and literary criticism emerged along with the feminist movement. 
The rediscovery of Woolf as a writer on feminist issues called for a revaluation and a re-
evaluation of her works, and many joined in the discussion of whether or not Woolf was truly 
a feminist, and in what way. A Room of One’s Own became one of the most debated texts in 
feminist criticism, much due to its concept of androgyny as a creative ideal. Less outspokenly 
feminist and anti-patriarchal than Three Guineas, an essay published a decade after A Room of 
One’s Own, the latter has been accused of shying away from important political matters and 
refusing to take a stand in the debate on feminism, excusing and veiling its arguments in 
layers of irony, ambivalence and self-contradictions. One of the most prominent voices 
expressing this view of Woolf is Elaine Showalter.  
Taking as her point of departure Carolyn Heilbrun‟s celebration of the Bloomsbury 
Group‟s androgynous lifestyle1 (Showalter 263), Showalter claims that aesthetic androgyny 
represented no more than a means of flight to Woolf, a “myth that helped her evade 
confrontation with her own painful femaleness and enabled her to choke and repress her anger 
and ambition” (Showalter 264). Seeking a re-evaluation of the close to iconic status of Woolf 
among contemporary women writers, Showalter calls for a demystification and even killing of 
“the legend of Virginia Woolf” (Showalter 265), the Woolf who has herself become the Angel 
in the House she described in her essay “Professions for Women”. Drawing on Nancy 
Topping Bazin‟s understanding of Woolf‟s androgyny as an attempt to reconcile the manic 
and the depressive stages of her mental illness, associated with femininity and masculinity 
respectively (Bazin 6), Showalter suggests that her androgynous vision was “a struggle to 
keep two rival forces in balance without succumbing to either” (Showalter 266). This struggle 
                                                          
1
 Carolyn Heilbrun, Towards a Recognition of Androgyny, New York, 1973, p. 123. 
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and unwillingness to fully embrace her femaleness, Showalter connects with what she calls 
“crises in female identity” (Showalter 267); reminders of her own mortality and most 
importantly her physicality as a woman, as a female body. The „room of one‟s own‟, 
Showalter claims, “is a symbol of psychic withdrawal, an escape from the demands of other 
people” (Showalter 286). Woolf‟s aesthetic ideal seems to Showalter a cowardly solution to 
an existential dilemma, a betrayal of her own sex and a flight that must not be confused with 
the liberation that critics such as Heilbrun believe it to represent. The narrative style and 
structure of the essay which was applauded though frequently misunderstood at the time of its 
publication, Showalter finds extremely defensive and impersonal, and she complains that 
“[e]ven in the moment of expressing feminist conflict, Woolf wanted to transcend it. Her wish 
for experience was really a wish to forget experience” (Showalter 282). Although grasping the 
irony intended in comments such as “[w]omen dislike women” (AROO: 109), on the whole 
Showalter cannot see the parodic passages, the distanced „I‟ persona and the ultimate flight 
into utopian androgyny as anything but a sly refusal to be earnest about a serious topic. Not 
only betraying and stifling her literary talent, in Showalter‟s terms, Woolf‟s problem of 
achieving “a coherent and comfortable sexual identity” (Showalter 265) made her “as 
thwarted and pulled asunder as the women she describes in A Room of One’s Own” 
(Showalter 264), ultimately leading to her tragic suicide.  
 
Deconstruction: Moi’s Kristevan Approach 
Showalter‟s view of Woolf‟s flight into androgyny remained relatively unchallenged until 
Toril Moi wrote her introduction to Sexual/Textual Politics in 1985. Moi opens her discussion 
by pointing out what she considers Showalter‟s main mistake in reading A Room of One’s 
Own; understanding the “repetition, exaggeration, parody, whimsy, and multiple viewpoint” 
(Showalter 282), as well as Woolf‟s technique of  “refusing to be pinned down to one 
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unifying angle of vision” (Moi 3), as cowardly elusiveness and fear of taking a stand. As the 
absence of Woolf‟s personal experiences seems to Showalter to signify her lack of 
commitment to the feminist cause, Moi comments that “it would be reasonable to assume that 
[Showalter] believes that a text should reflect the writer‟s experience, and that the more 
authentic the experience is felt to be by the reader, the more valuable the text” (Moi 4). Moi, 
on her part, admires Woolf‟s rejection of the aesthetics of authenticity and the latter‟s 
patriarchal fundament celebrating the unified self modelled on the “powerful phallus”. This 
autonomous subject is “the sole author of history and the literary text: the humanist creator is 
potent, phallic and male - God in relation to his world, the author in relation to his text” (Moi 
8). With this view as a theoretical and political basis, Moi argues that Showalter‟s reading 
reduces the text to “a passive, „feminine‟ reflection of an unproblematically „given‟, 
„masculine‟ world or self” (Moi 8). 
 Moi goes on to suggest that Woolf‟s writing anticipates deconstruction in her 
exposition of how “language refuses to be pinned down to an underlying essential meaning” 
(Moi 9). Referring to Jacques Derrida and his theory of language as “an endless deferral of 
meaning”, a play in which no fundamental or transcendental unit defines and explains other 
elements, Moi launches the idea that Woolf consciously exploits “the sensual nature of 
language”, rejecting “the metaphysical essentialism underlying patriarchal ideology, which 
hails God, the Father or the phallus as its transcendental signified” (Moi 9). Presenting 
Kristeva‟s division of the feminist struggle into three positions, Moi argues that Woolf may be 
seen as representative of the third position, in which “[w]omen reject the dichotomy between 
masculine and feminine as metaphysical” (Moi 12). Moi uses Lily Briscoe in To the 
Lighthouse as an example of the subject deconstructing the oppositions of masculinity and 
femininity, which, according to Moi, is precisely what Woolf feels that the goal of the 
feminist struggle ought to be. Thus Woolf‟s concept of androgyny should be read in the light 
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of deconstruction; it is not “a flight from fixed gender identities, but a recognition of their 
falsifying metaphysical nature” (Moi 13). Moving away from feminism founded on difference 
as dichotomy, Moi again aligns with Derrida and his notion of différance as an endless 
displacement of meaning. The opposite of this view, Moi claims, would be Bazin‟s reading of 
androgyny as “the union of masculinity and femininity” (Moi 14), perpetuating the duality as 
essential and „meaningful‟.  
 
Marcus’ Marxist Reading 
Another feminist critic discussed by Moi is Jane Marcus. Moi‟s accusations against Marcus 
echo her argument against Showalter, in that they both seem to take a biographical approach 
in their readings of Woolf‟s works. Moi‟s critique is based on the article “Thinking Back 
Through Our Mothers”, in which Marcus describes Woolf as a “guerilla fighter in a Victorian 
skirt” (J. Marcus 1), a socialist and feminist trembling with fear and anger as she wrote. The 
direct causality Marcus establishes between Woolf‟s emotional experience of writing and her 
actual works is attacked by Moi as a “fall back into the old-style historical-biographical 
criticism much in vogue before the American New Critics entered the scene in the 1930s” 
(Moi 17). Like Moi, Marcus associates Woolf‟s aesthetics with Brecht, though focusing more 
on the so-called collective aspect of her writing, what she calls the “collective sublime” (J. 
Marcus 6). Taking as her starting point Woolf‟s metaphor of maternally inherited creativity, 
Marcus reads Woolf's essays as expressions of an “anti-individual „philosophy‟” (J. Marcus 
10) standing up against the male, false ego, the „I‟ failing as a creative subject. For Marcus, 
Woolf's maternal metaphor of creative heritage and her idea that “masterpieces are not single 
and solitary births; they are the outcome of many years of thinking in common, of thinking by 
the body of the people, so that the experience of the mass is behind the single voice” (AROO: 
66), signify an aesthetic concept going against the idea of solid and solitary genius, while 
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simultaneously preserving “the romantic notion of literary progress” (J. Marcus 10). The 
moral authority of the poet is thus “derived not from an individual talent but from the 
expression of collective consciousness. The „egotistical sublime‟ of the patriarchy has been 
replaced by a democratic feminist „collective sublime‟” (J. Marcus 10). 2 
For Marcus, Woolf‟s use of English as a “fertile and promiscuous mother tongue” (J. 
Marcus 17) shows her insistence on the creative and liberating potential of language as a 
mother through which to think back. Marcus sees Woolf‟s collective principle as specifically 
feminine, and despite her agreement with Showalter that “[Woolf] was pushing the literary 
she-condition further and further towards the objective universal condition” (J. Marcus 18), 
Marcus feels that Woolf was true to the feminist cause. Language became the alternative to 
killing the Angel of the House, a way of avoiding “mental matricide” for the daughters and 
instead create “a linked chain of sisterhood over past time in present space, and rescue and 
redeem their own mothers‟ lives from their compromises with the patriarchy” (J. Marcus 21). 
For Marcus, the ultimate achievement of Woolf was her composition of a myth of female 
creativity and her encouragement for her „daughters‟ to restore and revise their past in the 
image of the “collective sublime”. To me, Marcus‟ constant focus on the maternal aspects of 
Woolf‟s concept of creativity appears to evade the latter‟s explicitly androgynous ideal, 
expressing a political agenda that may limit the potential of her reading.  
 Marcus‟s understanding of Woolf‟s writing as “a revolutionary act” (J. Marcus 1), as 
                                                          
2
 Marcus has quite a literal understanding of the maternal inheritance of creative consciousness, referring to 
Woolf‟s relationships not only to her mother and sisters, but to aunts and other female friends, and how they 
greatly influenced her thinking and writing. Two women acquaintances, the social worker Margaret Llewelyn 
Davies and the composer Ethel Smyth, were allegedly of particular importance to Woolf. Marcus suggests a 
likeness between Davies and Mrs. Ramsay as the nurturing mother figure caring for the sick, and likewise 
compares Smyth to the passionate hostess, carefully „composing‟ her parties and social gatherings. Smyth‟s 
views on the structural and rhythmical aspects of creative composition were especially interesting to Woolf, 
always concerned with the musical qualities of language and how writing is essentially a rhythmic arrangement 
of words (J. Marcus 19). In this musical metaphor, harmony and disharmony are associated with the feminine 
and the masculine respectively. Davies and Smyth‟s ways of engaging with socialism and the suffragist 
movement were also significant in their relations to Woolf. Marcus views all three of them as “mothers”, Davies 
of feminism, Smyth of music and Woolf of literature, in the sense that they provided a fundament for “daughters” 
to develop and think back through in their own creative and political processes. 
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well as her focus on linguistic rhythm beyond conscious creativity, seems to echo Kristeva‟s 
view of modernist poetry as “a „revolutionary‟ form of writing [...] in which the rhythms of 
the body and the unconscious have managed to break through the strict rational defences of 
conventional social meaning” (Moi 11). However, Moi sees an essential difference between 
Marcus and Kristeva in their attitudes to the fixity of gender identities, and what it means to 
be a feminist. Moi questions Marcus‟s rather biographical comparison of Woolf with the 
Marxist critic Walter Benjamin, and it might be suggested that Marcus represents the second 
tier in the scheme of the feminist struggle, as summarised by Moi: “Women reject the male 
symbolic order in the name of difference. Radical feminism. Femininity extolled” (Moi 12).  
 
Psychoanalytical Perspectives: Bowlby, Jacobus and Minow-Pinkney 
Marcus‟s wish to “retrieve the radical political dimension of Woolf‟s writing” (Minow-
Pinkney x) was seen as valuable by many, but challenged by just as many feminist critics. 
Moi‟s was a significant and central contribution to the debate, but there were various other 
voices making heard their opinions on the re-evaluation of Woolf's aesthetic and feminist 
agenda. Makiko Minow-Pinkney and Mary Jacobus both represent a psychoanalytical 
approach to Woolf‟s works. Concerned with the difference of „the feminine sentence‟, they 
refer to Kristeva as well as Jacques Lacan, to show how language may be seen as a point 
where the so-called symbolic order meets the semiotic order.  
In her article “The Difference of View”, Jacobus focuses on the deconstructive quality 
of a „feminine language‟, as  
a process that is played out within language, across boundaries [,] allying feminism 
and the avant-garde in a common political challenge to the very discourse which 
makes them possible; the terms of language itself, as well as the terms of 
psychoanalysis and of literary criticism, are called into question - subverted from 
within (Jacobus 29-30).  
 
Echoing Moi‟s view, Jacobus does not share the traditional view of difference as opposition, 
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but rather sees difference “as a multiplicity, ambiguity and heterogeneity which is that of 
textuality itself” (Jacobus 30). „Feminine writing‟ cannot escape patriarchal discourse, but it 
can aim to disrupt and deconstruct it; “to write what cannot be written” (Jacobus 30). She sees 
this disruptive quality in Woolf‟s attack on Charlotte Brontë; by referring to a „mother‟ writer 
and her anger, Woolf edits Brontë‟s anger into her own text and “creates a point of instability 
which unsettles her own urbane and polished decorum” (Jacobus 35). For Jacobus, this 
transmission of anger between literary mothers and daughters paradoxically signifies both 
disruption and continuation. By introducing Brontë‟s excessive emotion, Woolf tears a hole in 
her own text, creating a rift which “exposes the fiction of authorial control and objectivity, 
revealing other possible fictions, other kinds of writing; exposes, for a moment, its own terms” 
(Jacobus 35). The concept of androgyny becomes, for Jacobus, “a harmonizing gesture” 
(Jacobus 39), overcoming the “splitting off of consciousness” (AROO: 96) experienced by the 
woman excluded from educational institutions; dissolving “the repressive male/female 
opposition which „interferes with the unity of the mind‟” (Jacobus 39); and opening up for a 
mind that is undivided and whole - not monolithic, but rather heterogeneous and unimpeded, 
“open to the play of difference” (Jacobus 39). Again reflecting Moi‟s thoughts, Jacobus here 
seems to affirm Kristeva‟s third position rejecting a metaphysical gender dichotomy.   
 Minow-Pinkney represents a slightly different reading of difference and androgyny. 
She draws heavily on Lacan‟s division between the symbolic and the semiotic phases of 
human life, associating the latter with the feminine in language, defending “difference against 
the existing order of a discourse of sameness organised around a single standard, the man, or, 
in psychoanalytic terms, the phallus” (Minow-Pinkney 10). Minow-Pinkney understands 
Woolf in her early works as repressing “a potential feminist awareness and universalis[ing] 
the issue into the Oedipal polemic of the generations” (Minow-Pinkney 2). However, the 
feminist issue comes more into focus in Woolf‟s later writing, showing, in Minow-Pinkney‟s 
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terms, how “modernism and feminism constitute a single awareness and concern [and] her 
declaration of an urgent need for new fictional modes is a protest against Lacan‟s symbolic 
order” (Minow-Pinkney 14). The seemingly self-contradictory argument of claiming a 
woman‟s sentence and simultaneously defending an androgynous ideal, Minow-Pinkney 
explains by referring to the difference between the self-contained „I‟ found in male poetry and 
her own multiple „I‟. The female split self is consequential of the “splitting off of 
consciousness” (AROO: 96) experienced by women due to their position “at once outside and 
inside the dominant order” (Minow-Pinkney 10). Woman‟s entry into the Oedipal phase is 
made complex by her necessary confrontation with phallocentricity in the form of language, 
which belongs to the symbolic realm. In other words, it is required that she identify with her 
father and the phallus in order to confront her mother and her own womanhood. This is not to 
say, however, that her origin is in a purely feminine semiotic state, “for it is situated in the 
pre-Oedipal phase, i.e., before sexual difference appears [and] the pre-Oedipal mother 
contains, for the baby, both masculinity and femininity” (Minow-Pinkney 21). The complex, 
multivalent position of woman is to Minow-Pinkney both a privilege and a curse which makes 
her inevitably androgynous, as “Woolfian androgyny involves a dialectic of symbolic and 
semiotic, of man and woman” (Minow-Pinkney 189). 
 Rachel Bowlby too makes reference to French feminism and psychoanalytic theory in 
her reading of A Room of One’s Own, distinguishing male and female writing as mentally 
“trained” and mentally “wandering” respectively. The feminine sentence is part of the 
language of the outsider, she or he excluded from patriarchal institutions, who thus develops a 
different kind of thinking and a writing, a sentence of her or his own. Representing a new 
view of style, structure and subject matter, feminine writing is “a challenge to the priority and 
interest of the mountain peaks of the present empire” of patriarchal literature. The feminine 
sentence discovers, uncovers and presents new land in the “half-lit atmosphere of a place not 
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so readily put on the general map” (Bowlby I: 183). Bowlby refers to Freud‟s likening of girls‟ 
discovery of their female sexuality to the discovery of an ancient civilisation lying in the 
historical shadow of ancient Greece. Understood as the exploration of a dark continent, a 
repressed and forcedly forgotten civilisation, “feminine writing, by whichever sex, is writing 
which breaks up, or is antecedent to, the conventions and boundaries of „civilized‟ 
representation”. Thus, it is “not just one more literary field, but that form of writing which 
throws into question the status of all the rest” (Bowlby I: 184). As such, Bowlby connects the 
feminine sentence with the bisexual pre-Oedipal phase, and by association with the 
unconscious and the body. The fishing image in which Woolf‟s essayist is interrupted by a 
Beadle is representative of the silencing of the submerged alternative voices trying to “write 
what cannot be written”, but also of the ungraspable, inherently „invisible‟ nature of the 
feminine sentence which, like the fish, loses its potential once it is formulated, “brought into 
the light of representation at the price of assimilation and thus by the loss of what makes it 
different” (Bowlby I: 185). The marginal position of the feminine sentence and the female 
writer is a position of possibilities, as opposed to the fixed, obedient and trained kind of writer 
who “runs into [his] answer as a sheep runs into its pen” (AROO: 30). The question of the 
feminine sentence becomes a question of “Beadle or woman? Sheep or Woolf?” (Bowlby I: 
189).  
The question of the concept of androgyny, however, is not as dualistically simple. 
Bowlby explains the vision of the couple in the taxi cab as necessarily involving a third party, 
the visionary voyeur imagining the male-female „completeness‟ at the safe “distance of a 
satisfying scene for the narrator looking on” (Bowlby I: 192). To Bowlby, this inherent 
intrusion of a male spectator fantasising about a natural union of the masculine and the 
feminine in the writer‟s mind exposes Woolf‟s androgynous vision as a reactionary, 
patriarchal concept. 
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Rado’s Historicist Critique  
A more recent approach, which also draws on psychoanalysis, but to a greater extent 
historicises the matter of Woolf‟s concept of androgyny, is the one taken by Lisa Rado. 
Attacking fellow critics for what she sees as an anachronistic misuse of the term „androgyny‟, 
in that it seems based on postmodern feminist literary theory, Rado describes the various 
meanings of androgyny through history, to explain how “the modern androgyne imagination” 
must be read contextually and understood as indicative of a specific historical and cultural 
moment. The notion of „imagination‟ is closely linked with „authorship‟, and Rado shows  
how the history of authorship as involving a relation between feminine and masculine 
elements goes back to classical Greek literature but has changed over time.  
For the poet or author to claim authority as a creative subject, it has at all times been 
important to defend his or her inspiration as establishing a link with “loci of ultimate 
authority” (Rado 2). These loci are culture-specific and vary in time, but have usually been in 
the form of some deity or divine force, such as God or Nature. This, to Rado, shows how art is 
a response to and a reflection of “the artist‟s need [not so much] to be inspired as to be 
empowered and authorized by the culture within which he or she creates” (Rado 2). Male 
poets have had a tradition of presenting their art as “transcriptions of divine utterance [and] 
formulations of spiritual truth” (Rado 3) through being possessed by “an imagined female 
entity with whom [they engage] in some sort of psycho-sexual relation” (Rado 3). Rado 
quotes Plato as equating inspiration with possession by a muse who will give the poet‟s 
narrative “considerable authenticity”, as well as “underscore the poet‟s heroic manliness and 
virility” (Rado 3) by selecting him over other men. Inspiration and authorship are thus matters 
of divine seduction and external possession rather than products of an individual 
consciousness, “agency or talent” (Rado 4).  
 Approaching the Romantic period, the perception of inspiration and imagination 
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changes with the increasing awareness of a male consciousness as opposed to a female 
possessive muse, leading Alexander Pope to claim “he must „guide‟ or control her; rather than 
lose himself in her honeyed lips” (Rado 6), to avoid feminisation. Rado also argues that 
Edmund Burke‟s theory of the sublime is “a complex attempt at inhibiting the threat of 
incorporation and loss of control that for him certain aspects of nature, and specifically the 
female body, represent” (Rado 7). The Romantic poets went even further in incorporating and 
appropriating what they saw as threatening female elements into their male „imagination‟, 
seeking to define and defend the borders of creativity as a masculine domain and “usurp the 
realm of sensibility to reestablish their artistic prerogative” (Rado 8). „Romantic androgyny‟ 
may thus be seen as a reflection of “a new defensiveness about the uniqueness of authorship 
and the autonomy of the (male) artist in the creative process”, engulfing and silencing the 
female voice (Rado 9).  
Relying upon the hierarchical opposition between a male artist-subject preserving 
himself against a female muse-object, this model of authorship and imagination became 
increasingly difficult to uphold as the general perception of gender relations and sexual 
categories changed dramatically around the turn of the twentieth century. Due to social tumult 
in such forms as suffrage, the Industrial Revolution and the First World War, as well as 
scientific studies of sex and sexuality, a sense of sexual indeterminacy was growing and the 
binary model of gender seemed less relevant as a new “three-sex” (Rado 11) model of sexual 
categories was proposed.  While heavily debated as either a creative ideal or a figure of 
degeneracy, the notion of an androgynous third sex offered transcendence of the „two-sex‟ 
categorisation in terms of an alternative imagination suited to the aesthetics of “male 
modernists searching for a means to restore their artistic prerogative while it provided female 
modernists with a way to transform their position from aesthetic objects to active creators” 
(Rado 13). Rado claims, however, that this was a dead end as regards artistic liberty, and that 
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feminist critics of the last couple of decades are mistaken in assuming that “the fusion of so-
called masculine and feminine characteristics has an emancipatory potential” (Rado 13), 
reading “the modern androgyne imagination” with postmodern eyes, rather than considering 
“Woolf‟s attraction to androgyny from the perspective of her cultural moment” (Rado 139).  
Embracing the modern androgyne imagination would also be a risky act in the sense 
that “on the one hand it promises the possibility of virtually unlimited empowerment and 
inspiration, on the other hand, the model of an androgyne imagination at the same time 
threatens to annihilate the self from which it has been generated” (Rado 20). Rado argues that 
the „androgyne imagination‟ failed as an escape from “the gendered crises of authority and 
inspiration” (Rado 20) and sees similarities with the concept of the sublime, in which 
threatening external elements are incorporated and made part of a “powerful and terrifying 
experience [...] as both an effect and a strategy rooted in a specifically psychosexual dynamic” 
(Rado 21). Nevertheless, Rado sees the modernists‟ attempt at reaching “heightened states of 
consciousness” through androgyny as a failed act of sublimation. This failure is grounded in 
“a problem within the theory of the sublime: its assumption of a unique and unassailable 
subjectivity”, staging an illusion of control and the possibility of having a self. The idea of a 
heroic “androgynous sublime” was a last resort for “modern writers terrified of losing their 
artistic authority within the facelessness and genderlessness of twentieth-century mass 
culture”. The risk of losing themselves in an inherently unstable androgyne imagination 
shifting with the “cultural definitions of sexual categories” (Rado 22) seemed worth taking, 
even if it implied suppression of the body as well as an ironic distance to individual poetic 
empowerment, weakening the argument of androgyny as an artistic dogma.  
This was Woolf‟s attitude, Rado claims and argues that Woolf was ambivalent about 
her aesthetic stance all her life, “continually faced with the threat of psychic dissolution 
through the terrifying loss of boundaries that her androgynous model necessitates” (Rado 24). 
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Woolf‟s strategy of sublimation, her artistic restoring of her crushed consciousness after 
mental breakdowns by incorporating frightening experiences into some compositional whole, 
a “repository of meaning” (Rado 146), becomes a falsifying act, repressing “the real causes of 
the trouble: those anxieties about the vulnerability of both her artistic authority and her female 
body that the sledgehammer blows – those memories of male violence and cultural oppression 
– revive” (Rado 146). Woolf‟s androgynous vision presents itself to Rado as an attempt to 
incorporate “the destructive and powerful element – in her case the threat of modern 
patriarchal norms – within her own aesthetic framework” (Rado 146-147), in order to 
overcome her insecurities as a woman writer and a female, “corporeal self” (Rado 147). Rado 
also calls it an attempt to restore a sense of individual consciousness and authority, and 
disagrees with Marcus that Woolf‟s aesthetic represents “liberation from the ego”; “[r]ather 
than liberation from identity, Woolf [...] is striving for a woman to possess an identity” (Rado 
149).  
Rado‟s reading of Woolf‟s concept of androgyny and creativity in A Room of One’s 
Own has clear implications for her interpretation of To the Lighthouse, to which we will 
return in the next chapter. The paradoxical nature of androgyny, presupposing a “primal 
unity”, affirming the existence of a “transcendental subject while simultaneously denying it” 
(Rado 181), Rado sees as symptomatic of a growing suspicion of the possibility and validity 
of universal ideals which would express itself more clearly in the diversity of postmodern 
theory; “many modernist artists nevertheless seem to want to avoid admitting that there may 
never have been a center at all” (Rado 182). Although one can spot characteristics of 
deconstructive thinking and postmodern ideas in “the modern androgyne imagination”, and 
while new modes of theorising on the topic may give interesting perspectives, the concept 
must be contextualised and understood in terms of the cultural premises of the day. 
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The Slipperiness of Androgyny: A Heterogeneous Debate 
From Heilbrun to Bowlby, from Moi to Rado, what should one make of these very different 
readings in terms of Woolf‟s idea of androgyny? How do they relate to her concept of 
creativity and the creative subject? While it has been necessary to narrow down the number of 
debating contributors presented, they represent a wide range of interpretations, which, 
although they all express individual voices, can loosely be grouped into a few „camps‟ of 
theoretical viewpoints. The debate is indeed heterogeneous, gathering voices from various 
parts of the theoretical landscape, agreeing or arguing with each other in terms of human 
subjectivity, sexual categories and artistic creativity. As we have seen, central contributors, 
such as Showalter and Moi, contrast sharply in their views of the „stable ego‟ and to what 
degree it is responsible for and in control of its actions, and of language. While Moi may be 
said to represent a poststructuralist approach to Woolf, Marcus focuses on the collective 
aspect of her works, seeing her aesthetics as one of solidarity and connecting Woolf with a 
Marxist worldview. Minow-Pinkney, on her part, reads Woolf from a psychoanalytical 
perspective, and is less concerned with its political dimension, seeing the creative conflict as a 
confrontation and struggle with the phallocentricity of language, “a dialectic of symbolic and 
semiotic” (Minow-Pinkney 189). The most recent turn in the debate is a more historicising 
approach, putting Woolf‟s concept of creativity in the contemporary context of scientific 
studies of „sexology‟.  
 The theoretical perspectives mentioned provide valuable and varied insight into the 
concept of creativity as it is presented in A Room of One’s Own. The various points of view 
have all been influential on my own reading of Woolf‟s essay, as I see interesting questions 
raised in each of them, however contradictory and fundamentally different they are in outlook. 
The heterogeneity of the discussion shows perhaps more than anything the slipperiness of the 
premises of the model of androgyny, as it “all too often escapes out of the grasp of critics and 
 
 
22 
 
settles back down into the sexual polarisation it is designed to avoid” (Wright 4), reinforcing 
the very gender stereotypes it allegedly set out to subvert. As mentioned, it has been much 
debated whether Woolf contradicts herself in promoting the „woman‟s sentence‟ the second 
before she asks the female writer not to think of her sex - in order to write pages “full of that 
curious sexual quality which comes only when sex is unconscious of itself” (AROO: 92). 
Does she mean that a woman using all the faculties of the brain, not considering whether they 
are conventionally labelled „masculine‟ or „feminine‟, will write differently from a man? 
Would this view not imply an establishment of the metaphysical poles of sexual opposites?  
I find Moi‟s deconstructive reading of Woolf as a non-essentialist to be productive, as 
it opens up for an understanding of androgyny not as a transcendental, objective state of mind, 
but rather as a will and ability to see the potential of the human mind that “is fully fertilized 
and uses all its faculties” (AROO: 97), never locking oneself in one subject, or indeed, object 
position, whether it be as a woman, as an artist or as a female writer. The traditionally 
assumed correspondence between biological sex and sexually constructed gender is indeed 
debatable, as is the mutual exclusivity of masculinity and femininity. The deconstruction of 
the repressive binary masculine/feminine opposition by which we categorise human character 
traits and by extension different kinds of writing seems necessary in order to keep the body of 
literature alive and moving, and to give birth to new modes of artistic expression.  
 Moi‟s postmodernist perspective stands in sharp contrast to the realist, close to anti-
modernist argument of Showalter, evaluating Woolfian androgyny as political escapism and 
unwillingness to commit to the feminist cause. Opposing both Showalter and Moi is Rado‟s 
view, criticising the tendency among feminists from the 1970s and onwards to read Woolf 
into their own political agenda or through a postmodernist lense. Historicising the concept, 
Rado explains Woolfian androgyny as a position emerging from a particular aesthetic 
tradition referring back to Coleridge and Shakespeare among others; at the same time, Woolf 
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was a part of her own contemporary context socially, artistically and politically, and this must 
be taken into consideration in order to understand Woolf‟s perception of the androgynous 
mind or “androgyne imagination”.  
I would defend Rado‟s criticism of the readiness to reading Woolf as a Kristevan 
postmodernist or a late twentieth-century feminist. The idea of androgyny has historical ties to 
male authors‟ explanation and understanding of their own creativity, as well as the 
transformation of female authors to become just that. Through the changing perspectives on 
creativity and androgyny in a new literary discourse, these women went from being mere 
objects of literature to becoming subjects of literary works. I think Rado is mistaken, however, 
when she concludes that androgyny is a dead end in creative concerns for authors applying the 
concept to their aesthetics, and that their „androgyne imaginations‟ must be understood as 
signs of fear of losing authority in and confronting the insecurities of an increasingly 
fragmented world. Rather than a dead end for literary discourse, and rather than representing a 
1970s feminist literary perspective disregarding Woolf‟s writing in the 1920s, her 
androgynous vision seems like a fertile response to the political and cultural factors of her 
own time. Belonging to the upper middle class while supporting Labour, along with feminist 
and pacifist organisations, and a general liberation of the individual, Woolf may well be 
described as a liberal humanist. As part of the project of modernity, Woolf, along with the 
liberal circle to which she belonged, promoted a new attitude to human relations; calling for 
the dissolution of the rigid English class system and for ways of governing that would respect 
the individuality of human beings as well as acknowledge their equality.  
  
Androgyny as Dialogue: A Bakhtinian View 
Woolf‟s political position and cultural context should be considered as backdrops in an 
exploration of her androgynous vision. I would argue, however, that her aesthetic argument 
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has a general humanist validity that makes purely historicising readings or exclusively 
feminist approaches to her works seem insufficient and even unjust. Woolf‟s relational 
understanding of creativity and specific comprehension of androgyny may require a different 
approach in order to have its potential more exhaustively explored. Leena Kore Schröder 
introduces Mikhail Bakhtin in two articles on Woolf‟s aesthetic agenda, “Mrs Dalloway and 
the Female Vagrant” and “‟The Drag of the Face on the Other Side of the Page‟: Virginia 
Woolf, Bakhtin and Dialogue”, showing how Mrs Dalloway in particular, but also other titles, 
relate to Bakhtin‟s ideas of dialogue and dialogism. A Bakhtinian approach to Woolf‟s works 
provides an explanation of androgyny as having validity beyond matters of history or aspects 
of sex and gender. A dehistoricising, aestheticising and dialogical perspective of the concept 
of androgyny contributes to the debate with a view to acknowledging the ethical basis of her 
artistic agenda, at the same time showing how Woolfian androgyny transcends its historical 
context as well as the somewhat myopic feminist perspective it has been subject to.  
I have taken as the basis for my Bakhtinian reading the Russian philosopher and 
literary critic‟s essay “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” as published in the anthology 
Art and Answerability. Central to Bakhtin‟s architectonics is the activity of perception, 
understood as the subject‟s making meaningful wholes out of separate elements and 
consummating an object, much like an author‟s creating a text. The essay is based on the 
“dialogical paradox” (Holquist in introduction to AA: xxvi) of “the ethical event of being” (AA: 
32) and the fact that every one of us experiences reality from a unique place in the world, but 
so do all other human beings; “we are all unique, but we are never alone” (Holquist in 
introduction to AA: xxvi). The realisation that each person occupies a unique point of 
perception entails a generality of subjectivity and a convertibility of the relation between 
subject and object, between self and other. The self‟s point of perception, its uniqueness or 
“excess” of seeing, exists only in relation to the perspective of the other and constitutes no 
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determinate place in space and time. In other words, every self has the potential to be an other. 
The otherness of the self implies a dialogic or interlocative imperative which means we must 
be flexible and change places with one another to see where we are; „I‟ can see things „you‟ 
cannot and vice versa, and “[w]e must share each other‟s excess [of seeing] to overcome our 
mutual lack [of seeing]” (Holquist in introduction to AA: xxvi). The ethical relation of self to 
other, like the aesthetical author/hero connection, is a relationship of mutual consummation 
and co-authoring, creating a whole, a relative construct which acknowledges “the situatedness 
of perception and thus the uniqueness of the person, but it abhors all claims to oneness” 
(Holquist in introduction to AA: xxvi).  
The interlocative imperative explains aesthetic activity as the “comprehensive reaction 
of the author to the hero [that] is founded on a necessary principle and has a productive, 
constructive character. Indeed, any relationship founded on a necessary principle has a 
creative, productive character” (AA: 5). The necessity of such relationships consists in a kind 
of dialogical empathy expressed in the author‟s/self‟s “projecting [him-/herself] into [the 
hero/other] and experiencing his [/her] life from within him [/her]” (AA: 25). This empathic or 
imaginative approach is the first step in aesthetic activity, according to Bakhtin:  
Aesthetic activity proper actually begins at the point when we return into ourselves, 
when we return to our own place outside the suffering person, and start to form and 
consummate the material we derived from projecting ourselves into the other and 
experiencing him from within himself (AA: 26).  
Aesthetic activity may thus be explained as an event in which the self and the other, the author 
and the hero both create a whole outside of which none of them could exist. Rather than 
underscoring the opposition between author and hero, such an aesthetic event signifies the 
simultaneity of the two parts, creating not a static segregation of their perceptual positions, but 
instead a dynamic and heterogeneous whole in which “one cannot be understood without the 
other. The resulting simultaneity is not a private either/or, but an inclusive also/and” 
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(Holquist in introduction to AA: xxiii). In Bakhtin‟s architectonics, the terms „self‟ and „other‟ 
are paired together not so much because they are perceptually contrastive as because of their 
convertible relation and simultaneous existence. The fact that the „I‟ is an „other‟ to the „other‟ 
as an „I‟ must be evident in all ethical events and all aesthetical activity. The creativity or 
“productive character” of the inherently interlocative Bakhtinian self thus consists in its 
following the ethical imperative or “necessary principle” of dialogue, informing not just 
aesthetic activity, but human action and interaction in general.  
Analogous to the manner in which Bakhtinian dialogue “abhors all claims to oneness”, 
“Woolf simply abandons the restrictive binary equation for one of heterogeneous multiplicity”, 
Schröder points out, showing how “Bakhtin and Woolf both resist the canonical tendency [...] 
and celebrate the disunity of human language”, and how they “promote a representation of 
human interchange that is neither reduced into, nor pronounced by a dominant, authoritative 
voice” (Schröder II: 111; 113). In Bakhtin‟s words, self relates to other as author to hero, in a 
“fundamental, aesthetically productive relationship [...] in which the author occupies an 
intently maintained position outside the hero” (AA: 14). A truly dialogic relation is signified 
by “the author‟s loving removal of himself from the field of the hero‟s life [and] the 
compassionate understanding and consummation of the event of the hero‟s life in terms of 
real cognition and ethical action by a detached, unparticipating beholder” (AA: 14-15). The 
speaker in A Room of One’s Own represents something similar in insisting that her „I‟ persona 
is “only a convenient term for somebody who has no real being” (AROO: 6) and that her name 
“is not a matter of any importance” (AROO: 7). She also warns how self-consciousness, 
whether it be based on sex, age or other defining categories, may prevent the author from 
having “her genius expressed whole and entire [...] She will write of herself where she should 
write of her characters” (AROO: 70). It would seem that the opposite of the androgynous, 
creative mind is the self-conscious, unproductive mind; indeed, according to Bakhtin,  
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[a]n author is the uniquely active form-giving energy that is manifested not in a 
psychologically conceived consciousness, but in a durably valid cultural product, and 
his active, productive reaction is manifested in the structures it generates […] and in 
the selection of meaning-bearing features (AA: 8).  
The Bakhtinian creative subject is the artist who “sees his own creating only in the object to 
which he is giving form”. In fact, “such is the nature of all active creative experiences: they 
experience their object and experience themselves in their object, but they do not experience 
the process of their own experiencing” (AA: 6-7). The subject‟s position does not allow it to 
perceive itself from the outside, it cannot consummate itself the way it gives shape to the 
other, and this perceptual difference to Bakhtin demonstrates “a human being‟s absolute need 
for the other, for the other‟s seeing, remembering, gathering, and unifying self-activity” (AA: 
35-36). The Bakhtinian self/other connection is thus essentially relational and co-dependent.  
It seems worthwhile to compare Woolf‟s androgynous vision and Bakhtin‟s necessary 
principle or dialogical imperative in terms of conditions of creativity, also the former might 
shed some light on the notion of a “necessary principle” of being. The essay speaker envisions 
a man and a woman entering a taxi-cab together, which then “glided off as if it were swept on 
by the current elsewhere” (AROO: 95). The event is described as resulting from a “force in 
things”, a “rhythmical order” which pleases the essayist‟s mind in that it feels “as if, after 
having been divided, it had come together again in a natural fusion” (AROO: 96). The sight of 
the couple being swept away by the current makes her wonder whether thinking “of one sex 
as distinct from the other is an effort. It interferes with the unity of the mind” (AROO: 95). 
While this may appear to contradict Schröder‟s stress on the “disunity” of Woolf‟s aesthetic, 
other readings are possible. Woolf does not deny the existence of difference; rather, it seems 
that the androgynous mind is “less apt to make [sexual] distinctions” (AROO: 97), to 
distribute different human psychic capacities according to physical categories and to divide 
reality into strictly separate “different chambers” (AROO: 100). Rather than a resolution of 
two opposite „gendered mindsets‟, the discussion and dissolution of a fixed gender dichotomy 
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may be Woolf‟s aim when she asks, “if two sexes are quite inadequate, considering the 
vastness and variety of the world, how should we manage with one only?” (AROO: 87).  
Androgynous thinking thus allows for a range and a change, or several changes in 
perspective, accepting the „play of difference‟ and the consistent inconsistency, the 
unsettledness of the human mind. The “unity of the mind” then consists not in canonical, 
monological thinking, but on the contrary represents a mental state that is “resonant and 
porous [and that] is naturally creative, incandescent, and undivided” (AROO: 97); “some state 
of mind in which one could continue without effort because nothing is required to be held 
back” (AROO: 96). The unified, androgynous mind is thus a mind that is open to difference, 
or in Bakhtin‟s terms, to otherness, and that lets down the boundaries of the separate 
chambers so that the current may flow freely and according to its natural rhythm. Could it be 
this “naturally creative” state of mind that results from Bakhtin‟s “necessary principle”, the 
dialogical imperative? Does the “force of things” demonstrate this necessity of human 
existence, gathering parts together in a “fully fertilized”, “fully developed mind” (AROO: 97) 
transcending its separate chambers? 
The self that enters into dialogue with an other, the author who writes of her characters 
rather than herself seems to manifest the androgynous mind as Woolf sees it, and the 
imperatively dialogical self as described by Bakhtin, promoting empathy and exposing the 
idea of absolute identity, of absolute boundaries between people, as an illusion. The position 
of the creative subject appears to lie in “the author‟s loving removal of himself from the field 
of the hero‟s life” as well as in the dispensing of “the dominance of the letter „I‟ and the 
aridity, which, like the giant beech tree, it casts within its shade. Nothing will grow there” 
(AROO: 99). This relational understanding of Woolfian androgyny may become clearer when 
read in the context of the two novels around which the next chapters revolve. Through the 
exploration of character relations within and across three of Woolf‟s texts; A Room of One’s 
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Own, Mrs Dalloway and To the Lighthouse; this thesis will endeavour to shed some new light 
on Woolf‟s concept of creativity and androgyny from a dialogical perspective.  
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Chapter Two 
“Alone Together”: Mrs. Peters’ Hat and the Perpetual Movement of Clouds 
“It is the hat that matters most” (MD: 95), Septimus Warren Smith is told by his future wife 
Lucrezia, a short while before he proposes to her in a fret of panic over his loss of the ability 
to feel after having served in the war. The hat they make together a few years later, right 
before Septimus‟ suicide, stands as a substantial result of an attempt to overcome separateness 
in a space in which they can exist and create “alone together” (MD: 158) The hat seems to 
express and preserve something of them both: having sat “separated into different chambers; 
not a sound carried from one to the other” (AROO: 100) during Septimus‟ fits of madness, 
they come together in „a room of their own‟, a place in which to communicate and create not 
simply a hat for Mrs. Peters, but a work of art. “An aesthetic event can take place only when 
there are two participants present”, Mikhail Bakhtin says in his essay “Author and Hero in 
Aesthetic Activity”; “it presupposes two noncoinciding consciousnesses” (AA: 20), who must 
then engage in a dialogue. An isolated consciousness cannot produce; aesthetic activity is 
always an “expression of a relationship” (Dentith: 12). Mrs. Peters‟ hat is only one example 
of “artistic form and meaning emerg[ing] between people” (Dentith: 13) in Mrs Dalloway, 
showing how the relationship between self and other is foundational to all human interaction, 
including aesthetic activity. This chapter will investigate a few other examples of human 
relations in the novel, the degree to which they are dialogic and whether they may be seen as 
creatively productive.  
In Mrs Dalloway, the most debated relationship as an instance of artistic mentality and 
doubleness of personality is the bond between Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway. They 
never meet, but seem nevertheless to engage in a sort of communication or dialogue in that 
they mirror each other in terms of mental reflection. Both imbued with a deeply sceptical 
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attitude to the codes and conventions surrounding them, neither feels part of the society from 
which Septimus ultimately breaks away and in which Clarissa chooses to continue life. Each 
feeling caged in their respective rooms, Septimus concludes the only option of escape is to 
plunge to his death through the window, whereas Clarissa, pondering the young man‟s suicide, 
chooses to return from her private chamber to her party, where her guests are waiting, among 
them her two former „loves‟, Peter Walsh and Sally Seton, now Lady Rosseter.  
Peter‟s feeling of rejection has complicated his relationship to Clarissa ever since he 
proposed to her directly after having interrupted “the most exquisite moment of [Clarissa‟s] 
whole life” (MD: 38); being kissed at the age of eighteen by Sally at Bourton. Defensively 
fidgeting with his phallic pocket-knife during his conversations with the married Clarissa, 
Peter seems to reveal his self-consciousness and need for reassurance of his ego “as a unique 
I-for-myself in distinction to all other human beings” (AA: 37). Monotonously and 
monologically replaying the “terrible scene which he believed had mattered more than 
anything in the whole of his life” (MD: 69), Clarissa‟s refusal to marry him, Peter has spent 
thirty years “trying to explain [Clarissa]” (MD: 83) and her choice to marry Richard Dalloway 
instead of himself. Considering himself a free soul, a “solitary traveller” in the convention-
bound, conservative high society circles of Clarissa, Peter perceives Clarissa to have become 
his opposite; a “mere hostess” (MD: 83) who has left her ideals, denied herself „her real self‟, 
her youthful love of life and a passionate relationship with Peter in which they would go “in 
and out of each other‟s minds without any effort” (MD: 69). He fails to see, however, that he 
himself comes forward as a representative of colonial Empire, depending on people‟s praise 
and judging by the codes of the patriarchal society that he claims to reject. His „travelling‟ 
expresses a wish to return, to retreat to a motherly “great figure” who will let him “blow to 
nothingness with the rest” (MD: 63). Peter‟s love for the “purely feminine” (MD: 83) Clarissa 
reveals itself as a possessive passion, seeking the power to judge the object of affection 
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precisely as an object from which he distances himself, rather than another subject. It may not 
be her own ideals, but Peter’s ideals that Clarissa has left.  
Jacob Littleton explains Clarissa‟s dispassionate choice of husband as consequential of 
her being a nonbeliever as well as her rejection of “society‟s common props against the void: 
Walsh‟s passion, Kilman‟s religion, Bradshaw‟s Proportion”; the passionate Peter‟s judgment 
of her as superficially nonsensical in her hostessing “militates against his understanding her as 
thoroughly as she understands him. His occasional insights are ruined by complete 
misunderstandings grounded in his perceptions of what she should be” (Littleton 50), and 
what she should be in relation to him. Peter‟s self-consciousness, despite Clarissa‟s attraction 
to him, seems significant in her resolution to marry the rather dull Richard Dalloway. Being 
less passionate and less intense, Richard offers her the space she needs to think her own 
private thoughts, her “secret beliefs” (Littleton 46) about her parties; that they are “an offering; 
to combine, to create; but to whom? An offering for the sake of offering, perhaps” (MD: 134). 
This nonjudgmental, „art for art‟s sake‟ view she cannot share with anyone close to her, least 
of all Peter, who would not have accepted her parties as anything but shallow snobbery, who 
would neither have allowed Clarissa her privacy nor have understood her belief that “there is 
a dignity in people; a solitude; even between husband and wife a gulf; and that one must 
respect” (MD: 131).  
Clarissa‟s absolute need for a private space, a room of her own, might seem to be in 
opposition to her love of life as creation, as a combination of separate parts into a communal 
whole. Littleton‟s view of Clarissa as an artist whose aesthetic perspective reflects and 
extends to her views on “the ethical event of being” (AA: 32) and whose “artistry is the 
essential key to understanding her character” (Littleton 36), may shed light upon Clarissa‟s 
social gatherings as artistic events, as places for people to come together in dialogue, where 
there is no domineering, authoritative voice, neither of love, religion nor “Proportion”; “she 
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would not say of Peter, she would not say of herself, I am this, I am that” (MD: 9). Such 
concepts of implicit power and ego struggles are uninspiring to Clarissa, appreciating 
existence without judgment; “[w]hat she liked was simply life” (MD: 133), and life as 
heteroglot at that, letting forward a multitude of voices and viewpoints. In Leena Kore 
Schröder‟s words, “Clarissa is thinking both in the solitary seclusion of self, and in social 
interaction with the multiple other” (Schröder II: 114). Demonstrating how “a second 
participant is implicated in the event of self-contemplation” (AA: 33), Clarissa‟s interior 
monologue pondering the nature of herself and her parties is structured as a dialogue, 
positioning and negotiating itself according to others‟ perspectives and revealing the 
polyphonic and multicentred quality of language, how it is fundamentally dialogic and thus 
constantly renewed and ever “overpopulated – with the intentions of others” (Bakhtin3 in 
Schröder II: 113).  
Clarissa is also in constant dialogue through renegotiations of her past, of the days she 
spent at Bourton at the age of eighteen, when choices were made that would decide the course 
of the rest of her own, and perhaps other people‟s lives. She has given birth to Elizabeth, who 
is now the same age as Clarissa was at her marriage, and whom people are starting to compare 
to “poplar trees [and] garden lilies” (MD: 147). Riding the bus around London, Elizabeth 
ponders her future by „thinking back through her mother‟ as it were, and how she does not 
share Clarissa‟s fascination with high society London life. Elizabeth finds it “dreary” and the 
compliments paid to her a “burden”; “for she so much preferred being left alone to do what 
she liked in the country” (MD: 147). She is, however, excited about the constant movement of 
the bus, offering her stunning, shifting viewpoints and a multitude of possible destinations. 
Thinking she will become a doctor or a farmer, quite contrary to her mother who has no 
formal education, and feeling herself to be quite a “pioneer”, Elizabeth opts to go where “no 
                                                          
3Mikhail Bakhtin, ”Discourse in the Novel”, in The Dialogic Imagination, translated by Caryl Emerson and 
Michael Holquist (Austin: Texas University Press, 1990), pp. 293-94.   
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Dalloways came down [...] daily”; to the Strand, where Septimus and Rezia have sat on a 
bench a few hours before. Then, hearing her mother‟s voice in her head, knowing Clarissa 
would not want her daughter to wander off alone, Elizabeth decides she “must go home. She 
must dress for dinner” (MD: 150). She only just finishes a line of thought on the clouds 
coming in over the Strand so that “the omnibuses suddenly lost their glow” (MD: 152), before 
she herself mounts one of them heading back in time for her mother‟s party. Elizabeth muses 
that despite the clouds‟ having “all the appearance of settled habitations assembled for the 
conference of gods above the world, there was a perpetual movement among them”, and that 
“[f]ixed though they seemed at their posts, at rest in perfect unanimity, nothing could be 
fresher, freer, more sensitive superficially than the snow-white or gold-kindled surface; to 
change, to go, to dismantle the solemn assemblage was immediately possible” (MD: 152). 
Elizabeth imagines the clouds to be of a shifting, yet solid quality, so that “now they struck 
light to earth, now darkness” (MD: 152), mirroring Septimus‟ thoughts on the light and 
shadow which “now made the Strand grey, now made the omnibuses bright yellow” (MD: 
153). They are both at this moment reflecting Clarissa‟s aesthetic of „steady non-fixity‟; 
“[s]he would not say of any one in the world now that they were this or were that” (MD: 8). 
Clarissa seems to express a relational attitude, feeling that  
to know her, or any one, one must seek out the people who completed them; even the 
places. Odd affinities she had with people she had never spoken to, some woman in 
the street, some man behind the counter – even trees (MD: 167). 
She employs „arboreal‟ metaphors throughout the novel, imagining human existence as a 
series of significant moments that are connected like “buds on the tree of life” (MD: 31). 
Clarissa‟s view of trees as a symbol of natural creativity, of mental fertility and a plethora of 
perspectives growing and flowering on the same branch, seems to mirror Septimus‟ feeling 
that “trees were alive”, his sense of “the leaves being connected by millions of fibres with his 
own body” (MD: 24). Listening to a nursemaid sitting nearby, he muses that the human voice 
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“can quicken trees into life” (MD: 24), suggesting a connection of mutual inspiration, a sort of 
dialogue between human beings and plants. This might seem to call for a view of Clarissa‟s 
social gatherings as ethical and aesthetic „gardening‟, creating a coherent, harmonious whole 
in which every „tree‟ has its part to play in accordance with the others. Such compositions 
would leave no room for “the dominance of the letter „I‟ and the aridity, which, like the giant 
beech tree, it casts within its shade” (AROO: 99). Nevertheless, Clarissa‟s party is, in fact, a 
celebration of one, authoritative individual: the Prime Minister. Although he is described 
sparsely and his presence is rarely foregrounded, the fact that his prominent position lays the 
premise for Clarissa‟s party seems to contradict the idea of a dialogical whole originating in 
androgynous, heterogeneous unity.  
Moreover, within Clarissa‟s social scheme, Elizabeth is consigned to occupy the space 
as a delicately decorative poplar tree. Neither she nor Septimus seem content with their places 
in the post-war „garden‟ in which they live, feeling condemned by their cultural contexts of 
sex and social class. For Septimus, expectations of masculinity have led him to join the army 
and fight in the war, in which he has lost his best friend, possibly lover, and along the way his 
ability to feel, to come to terms with his experience in a social setting which does not accept 
his „weakness‟. Madness and eventually suicide seem to be the consequence and his last 
desperate resort. For Elizabeth, being born a girl in an upper class family means people 
expecting her to be delicate like a flower, with few ambitions other than being decorative, 
marrying well and embracing her position as a wealthy hostess having no opinions of her own. 
At the party, even her father does not recognise the girl looking “so lovely in her pink frock” 
as “his Elizabeth” (MD: 212), objectifying and thinking of his daughter in possessive terms 
and bereaving her of her dream of “being alone in the country with her father and the dogs” 
(MD: 147).   
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Belonging to defined layers of society, lower and upper middle class respectively, 
Septimus and Elizabeth feel judged and condemned by the social codes expecting them to 
submit to certain conventional forms of masculinity and femininity. In fact, as Schröder points 
out, the only person appearing to resist “the imperialist narrative” (Schröder I: 337) is the 
female vagrant, whose “old bubbling burbling song, soaking through the knotted roots of 
infinite ages [...] fertilising, leaving a damp stain” (MD: 89), is sung in a “voice of no age or 
sex, the voice of an ancient spring spouting from the earth” (MD: 88). Is it the voice of this 
old beggar woman, likened by Peter Walsh to a “wind-beaten tree for ever barren of leaves” 
(MD: 88), that has the power to quicken other trees, other minds into life? Challenging and 
living outside social conventions of sex, age and class, the female vagrant with her ageless, 
sexless voice appears reminiscent of “the androgynous mind [that] is resonant and porous; 
that […] transmits emotion without impediment; that […] is naturally creative, incandescent, 
and undivided” (AROO: 97). Her mere existence seems subversive of the authoritative 
narrative of English society, and her strangely alien, yet familiar song Schröder associates 
with Bakhtin‟s notion of the carnivalesque, abolishing social hierarchies, exposing their 
absurdity and “clearing the ground for an absolutely free investigation of [them]” (Bakhtin4 in 
Schröder I: 342). With no name nor home, existing on the outskirts of social convention, she 
is pitied by people as a poor creature, but with her anonymous, uncertain status, “the concept 
of personality is opened up, pluralised, blurred” (Schröder I: 341). This allows for a dialogic 
self that is not limited to certain categories or roles in the imperialist narrative, which the 
female vagrant seems to escape by having a voice of her own.  
Clarissa‟s „social garden‟ may be seen as the momentary manifestation of “the unseen 
part of us, which spreads wide” (MD: 167) as well as her belief that “on the ebb and flow of 
things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other, she being part, she was 
                                                          
4
 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 474 (no references to editor, publisher and year of publication 
given). 
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positive, of the trees at home” (MD: 9). Her attempt is to create a lasting moment expressing 
humanity as a whole, a forest or a garden in which all the trees are somehow connected; 
above or below ground; in life and/or after death; the visible is linked with the invisible, the 
roots interweaving and consummating each other in a web spreading below the surface, so 
that “the unseen might survive” (MD: 167). Clarissa‟s view may be said to simultaneously 
defy and embrace death, destabilising the absolute oppositions of life and death, of „seen‟ and 
„unseen‟. She cannot convince herself that “death ended absolutely” (MD: 9), recalling 
Bakhtin‟s dialogic perspective on linguistic meaning and human relations, that “nothing is 
absolutely dead”; meaning is created and recreated in an endless dialogue, and “there is 
neither a first word nor a last word” (Bakhtin, Estetika, in Holquist 39). In the context of trees 
as symbolic of the ever dialogic connections between people, Septimus‟ idea that “[m]en must 
not cut down trees” (MD: 26) seems metaphorical of and relevant as an ethical standpoint 
promoting human empathy. Clarissa‟s sense of connecting with others, her feeling “part of 
people she had never met; being laid out like a mist between the people she knew best, who 
lifted her on their branches as she had seen the trees lift the mist” shows her belief in the 
complexity and multidimensionality of human existence and experience; “but it spread ever 
so far, her life, herself” (MD: 10).  
The ongoing conflict of separate vs. collective, of singular vs. plural, of unique vs. 
anonymous inside Clarissa‟s mind gives Peter the impression that she is „wooden‟, in the 
meaning of „frigid‟, someone who refuses to take a stand and seeks to cover her shallowness 
with delicate manners and exquisite parties. Peter‟s perception of Clarissa as wooden and thus 
infertile (MD: 66), a dead tree so to speak, seems to be in opposition to his own dream of a 
feminine, fertile figure “made of sky and branches” (MD: 63), as well as to Clarissa and 
Septimus‟ imagining trees as symbolic of fertility, as “alive”. Peter also appears to equate 
anonymity with repressed emotions and lack of personality, of personal opinions expressed, 
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whereas Clarissa, contemplating the suicide of Septimus, thinks that “[a] thing there was that 
mattered; a thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop 
every day in corruption, lies, chatter. This he had preserved” (MD: 202). She feels somehow 
similar to him, thinking of the nameless “young man” she never knew as someone who has 
been true to his individuality, his uniqueness, by choosing a dimension of absolute anonymity; 
death. Anonymity may here be understood as freedom not to be pinned down to one view, one 
category, of escaping the „imperialist imperative‟, the conquest of “Bradshaw‟s Proportion”; 
“[d]eath was an attempt to communicate [...] There was an embrace in death” (MD: 202).  
Death is not Clarissa‟s choice, however; “she must go back. She must assemble” (MD: 
204). Her way of protecting herself from the conquering nature of „void-fillers‟ such as love, 
religion or „proportion‟ is different from Septimus‟ in its solution of the struggle between the 
uniqueness and the anonymity of the mist. Whereas Septimus‟ sensitivity to other people and 
their expectations has disabled his relating to them and „sensing‟ them, Clarissa‟s perceived 
connection to other people‟s existence makes her feel she can only go on, survive, by 
acknowledging the interchanging and mutually consummating, „co-authoring‟ quality of 
human relations. Like the mist is lifted by the trees, Clarissa needs “people, always people, to 
bring it out” (MD: 86), to create her feeling of being herself, of being alive. The same way she 
composes her parties, Clarissa picks out flowers to create the intended harmony in which each 
individual blossom has its part to play, and she feels as if “this beauty, this scent, this colour, 
and Miss Pym liking her, trusting her, were a wave which she let flow over her and surmount 
that hatred, that monster, surmount it all; and it lifted her up and up” (MD: 14). 
The „misty‟ quality of existence, however, seems to hold a promise as well as a threat 
to the individual; it becomes blurry, “shapeless”; “Is that a tree? No, it is a woman” (AROO: 
98). This seems particularly delimiting to Elizabeth, whom people see as a poplar tree rather 
than the grown woman she soon is. Clarissa‟s picking out flowers, as her party-planning in 
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general, seems to serve as an act of leaving out, of „transcending‟ intrusive elements, such as 
Elizabeth‟s teacher Doris Kilman, whom Clarissa does not like and whose influence on her 
daughter she suspects. Highly religious, as well as outspokenly socialist in her views, Miss 
Kilman represents to Clarissa the wish to „convert‟ that she detests and finds to be a central 
component in the “cruellest things in the world” (MD: 138); love and religion. Observing 
Miss Kilman‟s possessive passion for Elizabeth, Clarissa asks if she “ever tried to convert 
anyone herself? Did she not wish everybody merely to be themselves?” (MD: 138). The 
answer to this rhetorical question is less clear, however, and it seems legitimate to enquire 
whether Clarissa truly acknowledges her daughter‟s otherness, and whether her parties really 
have the ethical dimension that the dialogical relation suggests.  
Woolf herself declared she was “merely a sensibility” (Woolf5 in Minow-Pinkney: 59) 
when she wrote, refusing authoritative narration and making room for her characters rather 
than her „personal agenda‟. While this thesis deals with connections between the characters 
rather than Woolf‟s authorial relation to them, it might be relevant here to ask whether 
Woolf‟s aesthetic outlook is reflected in Clarissa‟s party-planning and way of life? 
Understanding Woolf‟s aesthetic in Bakhtinian terms and associating the „author‟ with the 
„self‟ and the „hero‟ with the „other‟ may lead to an interesting perspective on Clarissa‟s 
social gatherings as artistic, authorial compositions. In this context, it seems doubtful whether 
her parties express “the author‟s outside position in relation to the hero, the author‟s loving 
removal of [her]self from the field of the hero‟s life, [her] clearing of the whole field of life 
for the hero and his existence” (AA: 14), providing fertile soil in which the other can grow. It 
appears more likely that Clarissa‟s „aesthetic‟ intention may work as a “giant beech tree” 
(AROO: 99), throwing a long shadow over Elizabeth‟s part of „the garden‟, consigning her to 
the position as ornamental poplar tree and thereby “block[ing her] fountain of creative energy 
                                                          
5
 Virginia Woolf, A Writer’s Diary, edited by Leonard Woolf (1953), London, 1969. 
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and shor[ing] it within narrow limits” (AROO: 99). Her designing of a social composition 
which leaves no space for Elizabeth to live as she wishes to, “being left alone to do what she 
liked in the country” (MD: 147), is in fact a violation of Clarissa‟s own „nonjudgmental‟ ethic 
or aesthetic.   
Consigned to the poplar tree position, it is doubtful whether Elizabeth can flourish 
within the frames of Clarissa‟s aesthetic. Can she escape the object position and somehow be 
recognised by her mother and father as a subject, or will she be “killed by a [phallic] falling 
tree” like Clarissa‟s sister Sylvia, “a girl too on the verge of life” (MD: 85)? It may strike one 
as a bit ironic that her sister‟s death, for which she blames her father, is what steers Clarissa in 
the direction of her “atheist‟s religion of doing good for the sake of goodness” (MD: 85) in a 
composition which has no room for her own daughter. While employing a fluid style within a 
“conventional narrative form of third person and past tense”, Woolf‟s “writing tries to give 
voice to the specificity of a female subject who is outside any principle of identity-to-self” 
(Minow-Pinkney 83), Makiko Minow-Pinkney argues. It remains dubious whether the same 
thing can be said of Clarissa‟s parties; the social level on which they operate seems to require 
a specific kind of selfhood, but leave little space for the specific subjectivity of Elizabeth.  
It appears that the only female subject whose voice is allowed its specificity, 
remaining as she does “outside any principle of identity-to-self”, is the old vagrant singing in 
the street. Her song is sung outside the context of Clarissa‟s parties, of society as divided 
along the lines of class and gender, breaking the laws of linguistic meaning syntactically and 
semantically and thus remaining utterly indecipherable to the rational mind, “alien and 
[perhaps] critical” (AROO: 96). Perceived as the helpless sound of a “poor creature” (MD: 90), 
the vagrant‟s voice nevertheless permeates people‟s minds, “soaking through the knotted 
roots” of human relations, of pity and judgment, singing of love and “fertilising, leaving a 
damp stain” (MD: 89). Just as there is “neither a first word nor a last word” (Bakhtin, Estetika, 
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in Holquist 39) in the endless dialogue of meaning, the beggar woman‟s song is without 
“beginning or end” (MD: 88). The voice of the “wind-beaten tree for ever barren of leaves 
which lets the wind run up and down its branches” (MD: 88) is simultaneously an “invincible 
thread of sound [...] winding up clean beech trees and issuing in a tuft of blue smoke among 
the topmost leaves” (MD: 90-91), exemplifying the dialogic principle of mutual permeability.  
One might ask if a truly dialogic relation is only possible for those who stand 
completely outside the social system of class and gender, and who do not perform as social 
„I‟s on the level of community at which Clarissa‟s parties take place and where people such as 
Elizabeth are essentially objectified. Rather than a performing social „I‟, the vagrant and her 
voice seem expressive of a “mere sensibility” that permeates and is permeated in a continuous 
dialogue with its surroundings. Singing her song outside Clarissa‟s social garden, the “wind-
beaten tree” (MD: 88) “has no place within society but wanders freely as a tramp” (Minow-
Pinkney 73). Does this freedom protect “the privacy of [her] soul” (MD: 139), as Clarissa 
muses Septimus has done by throwing himself out of the window, into the absolute 
anonymity of death? Septimus and the vagrant share the inability to relate to people on the 
social level; they have their own voices but cannot express themselves in words that are 
recognised by others as meaningful. Septimus‟ plunge into “nothingness” is interpreted by 
Clarissa as an attempt to overcome and escape Bradshaw‟s “proportion”, an ego-driven, 
monologic force like love and religion. Ridding himself of all social attachment, Septimus 
also abandons his own ego but preserves the “thing [...] that mattered” (MD: 202); the privacy 
of his soul. Septimus‟ and the vagrant‟s “attempt[s] to communicate” (MD: 202) in the forms 
of death and vagrancy respectively represent states of utter solitude on the social level, though 
the novel seems to suggest an ultimate union of human relation beneath the veil of social „I‟s, 
beyond what we perceive as everyday life.  
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Nevertheless, does Mrs Dalloway offer any alternatives for Elizabeth? Within the 
framework of the novel, can she flourish as anything but a poplar tree? As a whole, the 
narrative does not appear to pose any options for her to voice her opinion in a language that 
her mother and father can recognise, without reducing her to a child or transforming her into a 
poplar tree. Can Elizabeth gain her own voice, her own “invincible” sound “winding up clean 
beech trees”, or must she remain in the shadow of such trees, running the risk of getting 
beaten down by them? Is it possible for Elizabeth to express herself without stepping outside 
the social space and into the anonymity of vagrancy or madness? The quiet life of mere 
existence that she dreams of appears out of the question within the limits of Clarissa‟s parties, 
requiring a kind of social „I‟ or selfhood which Elizabeth cannot seem to construct either for 
herself or for others.  
Deborah Guth suggests that Clarissa‟s vision of a transcendent social harmony is 
essentially a ritual of self-deception, turning people, Clarissa as well as the other 
„components‟, into symbols, in an act freeing them but simultaneously reducing them as 
individuals. Elizabeth does not understand her mother‟s “secret beliefs” and her way of 
protecting and expressing them by embracing the financially and socially extravagant, but 
personally anonymous lifestyle of a society hostess. While one may argue, as Littleton does, 
that Clarissa‟s parties represent subversion of the patriarchal power relations of subject and 
object within a socially conventional narrative structure, this „method‟ does not suit Elizabeth, 
who is of a new generation providing her with other opportunities.  
Elizabeth‟s own voice lacks representation in the social „scheme‟ of Mrs Dalloway, 
and such representation might be what Woolf seeks to provide through A Room of One’s Own, 
discussing the female sentence and the androgynous mind as expressed in a voice that has “no 
age or sex” and is not bound to traditional categorisations of gender and class. Such a voice 
may suggest for a woman, “whatever her mother might say, to become either a farmer or a 
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doctor”, without turning back feeling “it was much better to say nothing about it” (MD: 150) 
because of fear that no one would understand or recognise this plan. In 1928, at the time of 
the publication of A Room of One’s Own, Elizabeth would have been 23 years old and 
supposedly have had “certain advantages which women of far greater gift lacked even half a 
century [before]” (AROO: 91). She would clearly have been part of Woolf‟s target audience 
lecturing on “Women and Fiction”, the latter of which urges girls to receive an education and 
to look beyond the limits set for them by marriage. A Room of One’s Own may be said to go 
further where Elizabeth stops to return to her mother; it is an insistent wish to continue her 
quest and to truly “stimulate what lay slumbrous, clumsy and shy on the mind‟s sandy floor, 
to break surface” (MD: 150).  
Elizabeth‟s wanderings appear to anticipate the essayist‟s strolling around Oxbridge. 
While the former walks around on tiptoe, as if she was “exploring a strange house by night 
with a candle, on edge lest the owner should suddenly fling wide his bedroom door and ask 
her business” (MD: 150-151), the latter, having let her thought sway “hither and thither 
among the reflections and the weeds” of a great sea of ideas, finds herself stepping outside the 
main track and “walking with extreme rapidity across a grass plot” (AROO: 7), only to be 
intercepted by a Beadle indignantly explaining that “[t]his was the turf; there was the path” 
(AROO: 8). The multi-named speaker for whom “‟I‟ is only a convenient term” (AROO: 6) 
seems nevertheless to have come a little step further than Elizabeth, who is still trapped in a 
certain perception of women as “looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of 
reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size” (AROO: 37), expected to embrace their 
„poplar position‟ in the shadow of a twice as large “giant beech tree”. The special kind of 
selfhood, or womanhood rather, that is demanded of Elizabeth, is what prevents her from 
going “a little farther” (MD: 149). It seems that only “when womanhood had ceased to be a 
protected occupation” (AROO: 42), can she dare to follow the thought of having a profession 
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and a room of her own, a frame of mind in which she can “continue without effort because 
nothing is required to be held back” (AROO: 96).  
The disinterested outlook Elizabeth has on the social level of her mother‟s parties, on 
gender roles and class conventions, Clarissa interprets, and perhaps misinterprets, as 
immaturity; somewhat like Peter deems Clarissa “the perfect hostess”, Clarissa perceives 
Elizabeth to be “a perfect baby” (MD: 151). She finds this “charming”, however, suggesting 
that immaturity in women is a good quality. Clarissa nevertheless worries that Elizabeth does 
not care more about the compliments she receives; “[e]very man fell in love with her, and she 
was really awfully bored” (MD: 148). Her boredom seems not so much a result of sexual 
innocence as of some kind of unconsciousness of sex, expressing the idea that to think “of one 
sex as distinct from the other is an effort” (AROO: 95). But Clarissa‟s social scheme will not 
let her daughter „forget‟ her sex, and cannot explain her “odd friendship with Miss Kilman” 
(MD: 148) as anything but an expression of pity on Elizabeth‟s behalf.  
At the same time, in this context Clarissa herself seems to have „forgotten‟ her 
“completely disinterested” (MD: 36) relation with Sally Seton at Bourton, which resulted in 
“the most exquisite moment of her whole life” (MD: 38). Sally‟s wild nature and bold 
behaviour was utterly fascinating to Clarissa, who felt their relationship to have a certain 
“purity” and “integrity”; “a quality which could only exist between women” (MD: 37). Sally 
and Clarissa‟s companionship appears „pure‟ and free of the tension and aggression of the 
sexual power struggle within a man-woman relationship. Sally‟s inspirational effect on 
Clarissa seems profound politically and socially, even aesthetically in the sense that Sally‟s 
picking “hollyhocks, dahlias – all sorts of flowers that had never been seen together” (MD: 
36), recalls Clarissa‟s social gathering; “[h]ere was So-and-so in South Kensington; some one 
up in Bayswater; and somebody else, say, in Mayfair [...] and she felt if only they could be 
brought together; so she did it” (MD: 133-134).  
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Their relationship seems unresolved, however; ever since Peter interrupted their 
kissing and Clarissa promptly decided to marry Richard Dalloway, much to the horror of both 
Sally and Peter, Clarissa has barely spoken to either of them. Now Sally, with whom Clarissa 
“spoke of marriage always as a catastrophe” (MD: 37) and “meant to found a society to 
abolish private property, and actually had a letter written, though not sent out” (MD: 36), has 
become a wealthy society wife and the mother of five sons. In this context, Clarissa‟s feeling 
that “[t]he whole world might have turned upside down” (MD: 38) by Sally‟s kiss, proves 
false; rather than letting the kiss be “the revelation” (MD: 39) that causes her to break with the 
conventions she and Sally claim to rebel against, Clarissa lets “her moment of happiness” 
(MD: 39) be disturbed by Peter‟s “jealousy; his hostility” (MD: 39), so that the kiss remains 
“something infinitely precious, wrapped up” (MD: 39). Peter‟s “determination to break into 
their companionship” (MD: 39) prevents Clarissa and Sally from expressing their love for 
each other, and somewhat like the letter they have written, but never sent, their mutual 
affection ends up being “an inner meaning almost expressed” (MD: 35, italics mine). Could 
they fully have expressed their emotions, their „meanings‟ and continued their relationship? 
Would they still have become Mrs Dalloway and Lady Rosseter, the latter seeing Elizabeth as 
“a lily by the side of a pool” (MD: 211) and deeming Clarissa a snob caring only for the good 
opinion of her high society guests as she rushes away from her old friends at the party?  
Clarissa does not tell anyone when she withdraws to her room after hearing of 
Septimus‟ suicide. Upon parting the curtains she is surprised by a momentary „mirror image‟; 
“in the room opposite the old lady stared straight at her” (MD: 203). Clarissa has seen her 
before; the old woman would be “climbing upstairs” where she would “gain her bedroom, 
part her curtains, and disappear again into the background” (MD: 138). Clarissa muses how 
the other woman‟s unconsciousness of being watched expresses something “solemn” that 
must not be destroyed by love and religion; “the privacy of the soul” (MD: 139). Associated 
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with Clarissa‟s reflection, the old woman‟s straight stare seems to confront Clarissa with her 
own choices and alternatives as she ponders Septimus‟ death. The scene seems to exemplify 
Bakhtin‟s thought that “a second participant is implicated in the event of self-contemplation” 
(AA: 33), as well as his idea that “before a mirror [we] try to find an axiological position in 
relation to ourselves [...] we try to vivify ourselves and give form to ourselves – out of the 
other” (AA: 32-33). Clarissa feels an affinity and likeness with Septimus and is even “glad 
that he had done it; thrown it away while they went on living” (MD: 204). Septimus throws 
himself away, “vigorously, violently” out of his room, the walls of which confine and seek to 
„convert‟ him, upon noticing that “[c]oming down the staircase opposite an old man stopped 
and stared at him” (MD: 164). This old man descending the staircase parallels the old woman 
ascending her stairs in that they both appear to confront Septimus and Clarissa with their 
potential older selves, though they clearly have different effects upon their decisions 
concerning their participation in society and their roles at the social level.  
Septimus‟ way of preserving the privacy of his soul through absolute disconnection 
socially is not the way of Clarissa, who seems to seek this kind of preservation through social 
connection, through her party, rather than by letting herself “blow to nothingness with the rest” 
(MD: 63) in death. The sense of a universal sphere of belonging, of equal validity and respect 
for other people‟s otherness, Clarissa seeks to achieve in life as a social event. She 
acknowledges the importance and admires the solemnity of personal privacy in human 
character, but sees the individual as necessarily longing for belonging with other people 
through dialogue. This longing expresses a selfless rather than an egocentric quality; dialogue 
cannot take place within relationships of possessive love or religious conversion, as such 
relations do not respect the otherness of others. As the old lady turns off her light and 
disappears again into the background, Clarissa decides “she must go back. She must assemble” 
(MD: 204).  
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By “projecting” herself into an other, by putting herself in Septimus‟ place, Clarissa 
seems to have taken the “first step in aesthetic activity” (AA: 25). According to Bakhtin, 
aesthetic activity begins the moment “we return into ourselves, when we return to our place 
outside the suffering person, and start to form and consummate the material we derived from 
projecting ourselves into the other and experiencing him from within himself” (AA: 26). Does 
Clarissa‟s returning to her party signify a return into herself and thus fulfilment of Bakhtinian 
aesthetic ideals? While this question will be discussed later on in the present chapter, 
Clarissa‟s return to her party expresses a hopeful defiance of the idea that true dialogue, as a 
mutual connection and respect for the otherness and “privacy” of an other, is only possible 
through absolute disconnection from her lifestyle, or indeed, from life itself.  
Nevertheless, Clarissa‟s attempt still suggests that the dialogic relation is something in 
essence inaccessible, something that defies the rational mind, in that she takes an observer‟s 
or overseer‟s approach to her party. As she withdraws to her room, she becomes a true 
outsider to the party, but seems to go into a wordless dialogue with the woman in the house 
opposite hers. The “odd affinities” between them recall the emotional effect on Peter and 
Rezia of the indecipherable song of the vagrant. About to cross the street they become aware 
of the “voice of no age or sex” (MD: 88), seeming to connect with some deep emotional level 
with which they are usually not in touch; the “ancient song” (MD: 89) reminds them of 
something timeless that is only available in a short moment, recalling the idea that “[l]ife in 
the present instant is a narrow plank reaching over the abyss of death between the nothingness 
of past and future” (Miller 1993: 52). The vagrant‟s voice does not belong to life as they 
know it, and though she is clearly alive, her way of living does not make sense as definable, 
certain, accessible along conventional lines and „rules‟ of what life is and what it should be 
about. Her openness is interpreted as “nothingness”, her words are heard on the logical level 
as nonsense. Still, the vagrant‟s voice seems to make “all peering inquisitive eyes” and all 
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self-assertive „I‟s of the “passing generations” disappear, vanish, “like leaves, to be trodden 
under, to be soaked and steeped and made mould of by that eternal spring” (MD: 90), so that 
Peter and Rezia appear able to grasp the purpose of her asking, “and if some one should see, 
what matter they?” (MD: 90). It might be this question that starts permeating Rezia‟s relation 
to Septimus, so that they are able to create Mrs. Peter‟s hat “alone together”.  
The vagrant‟s song, however, the “invincible thread of sound [...] issuing in a tuft of 
blue smoke among the topmost leaves” (MD: 90-91), stands in sharp contrast to the sound of 
Big Ben, which “blent with that of other clocks, mixed in a thin ethereal way with the clouds 
and wisps of smoke and died up there among the seagulls” (MD: 103), announcing the arrival 
of Bradshaw‟s „Conversion‟ into the Smiths‟ house. Having moved on from seeing Rezia as 
“a lily, drowned, under water” (MD: 97) to perceiving her as “a flowering tree” (MD: 162), 
Septimus fears their fertile, dialogic relation will come to an end with the entry of Bradshaw, 
the “great destroyer of crops” (MD: 163), and his insistence on their separation. Hearing the 
voice of his good friend Evans in his head through “messages from the dead” (MD: 162), and 
feeling that he has lost the battle against “human nature” (MD: 107) in the form of Bradshaw 
and Holmes‟ “inquisitive eyes”, Septimus perceives his only option, in order to preserve his 
solemnity, his sensitivity and his dialogic relation to Rezia against the condemnation of 
human nature, to be “the rather melodramatic business of opening the window and throwing 
himself out. It was their idea of tragedy, not his or Rezia‟s (for she was with him)” (MD: 163-
164).  
Living on in Clarissa‟s thinking of him and his suicide, thus becoming „part of her‟, 
Septimus seems to have transcended the separation of human character from which 
„conversion‟ and power struggles issue. Has he solved “the supreme mystery”, which Clarissa 
believes neither Kilman‟s religion nor Peter‟s passion has solved, that “here was one room; 
there another” (MD: 140)? As we have seen, Clarissa‟s ever-ongoing project of solving this 
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mystery of human character, of people‟s need for privacy as well as communication with 
others, appears fertile in some respects and not so fruitful in other ways. Her idea that the 
“privacy of the soul” and the specificity of the human individual need to be acknowledged, as 
well as her thought that nothing should be judged as one thing simply, promote the openness 
and dialogue which she seems to achieve in her relation with the woman in the house opposite 
hers. At the same time, her thought that people must be allowed to flourish appears to have 
certain restrictions in the case of her own daughter, whom she tends to view possessively and 
somewhat patronisingly, thinking her to be naïve and childish; “a perfect baby”. Considered 
as metaphorical of Clarissa‟s party-planning, Sally‟s arranging of flowers, decapitating them 
and making them “swim on the top of water in bowls” (MD: 36) may seem like a forced way 
of creating effortless movement and harmony among individuals, depriving them of the stem, 
the primary axis from which the buds and flowers have developed.  
Mrs Dalloway can be read as an extensive negotiation of what it means to be a human 
individual and what it needs to flourish as one among many, as “buds on the tree of life”. On 
the one hand, in many ways it emphasises the importance of having „a room of one‟s own‟, 
exemplified by Clarissa‟s bedroom, the old woman across the street, and Septimus‟ resistance 
to Bradshaw‟s conversion. In the case of Septimus, however, the issue of having one‟s own 
room is presented from a different angle; while Bradshaw insists that Septimus “rest in 
solitude”, he orders that he does so “without friends, without books, without messages” (MD: 
108), within Bradshaw‟s own psychological regime. Asking Septimus and Rezia to “[t]rust 
everything to [him]” (MD: 108), Bradshaw demands that they separate, promoting the 
isolation of Septimus and his „feeling‟ of having lost the ability to feel. Bradshaw thus 
appears to express a different notion of privacy than Clarissa, who thinks that the „ego-
conscious‟ concepts of love and religion would destroy “the privacy of the soul” (MD: 139), 
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and who interprets Septimus‟ death as a preservation of this privacy and “an attempt to 
communicate” (MD: 202) outside Bradshaw‟s judgmental regime.  
Nevertheless, Guth has argued that Clarissa presents no real dialogic understanding of 
Septimus, reading her as “reducing Septimus to a symbolic leap of defiance” (Guth 39), 
defining him according to her own need of a self-deceptive ritual to justify her passivity and 
“incapacity to choose” (Guth: 41). In Bakhtinian terms, this would translate as Clarissa‟s 
failure to turn Septimus into “an answerable author” (AA: 32). Guth considers Clarissa‟s 
contemplation of herself in relation to Septimus as falsifying in a manner that Bakhtin would 
deem “absolutely alien to the ethical event of being”, introducing in the so-called other “not 
something productive and enriching, but a hollow, fictitious product [...] a soul without a 
place of its own [...] a participant without a name and without a role – something absolutely 
extrahistorical” (AA: 32). I would argue that these words might be more applicable to 
Clarissa‟s relation to her daughter, who seems reduced to a role and pressed into a scheme in 
which she does not fit. Clarissa‟s ethical and aesthetical „regime‟ or composition varies in its 
treatment of the different components, negotiating concepts such as privacy, isolation and 
communication differently. The view that dialogue can only be achieved by 
acknowledgement of people‟s privacy, but transcendence of their separation and isolation, 
seems to be the hopeful message in Clarissa‟s vision for her party. It has not developed, 
however, to acknowledge the privacy and individuality of Elizabeth, who must wait, one 
might imagine, for the multi-named narrating „I‟ of A Room of One’s Own to channel a 
previously unheard voice; the voice of the female creative subject who expands her operative 
territory to go beyond the traditional confines of the woman writer so that she may express 
herself on the literary as well as the social level.  
The essayist poses the possibility of a feminine sentence as the voicing of something 
previously repressed and unexpressed, of someone who had no representation until Mary 
 
 
51 
 
Carmichael lit “a torch in that vast chamber where nobody [had] yet been” (AROO: 84). 
Daring to let her idea unfold  and mature “among the reflections and the weeds” (AROO: 7) of 
the stream of thought, Mary Carmichael explores an area that “is all half lights and profound 
shadows like those serpentine caves where one goes with a candle peering up and down, not 
knowing where one is stepping” (AROO: 84), thus appearing one step ahead of Elizabeth as 
she walks down the Strand five years earlier, “shyly, like some one penetrating on tiptoe, 
exploring a strange house by night with a candle” (MD: 150). Having “gone further and 
broken the sequence – the expected order” (AROO: 91), Mary Carmichael could, perhaps, 
have inspired Elizabeth to keep on going down the Strand even after dark and not feel she had 
to go back for her mother‟s dinner.  
Clarissa muses how she “had once thrown a shilling into the Serpentine, never 
anything more”, whereas Septimus “had flung it away”(MD: 202); can Elizabeth find a way 
of exploring the serpentine caves without flinging herself away, without having to disconnect 
from the world completely, so that she might “catch those unrecorded gestures, those unsaid 
or half-said words, which form themselves, no more palpably than the shadows of the moths 
on the ceiling, when women are alone” (AROO: 84)? Mental expansion seems to require a 
bold step away from the public path, onto the private turf and away from the „harmonious‟ 
garden confining one to a certain position based on class and sex; for “we have too much 
likeness as it is, and if an explorer should come back and bring word of other sexes looking 
through the branches of other trees at other skies, nothing would be of greater service to 
humanity” (AROO: 87). Mary Carmichael seems to have peered through “the branches of 
other trees” and expanded her mental territory, for she “had a sensibility that was very wide, 
eager and free [...] It feasted like a plant newly stood in the air on every sight and sound that 
came its way” (AROO: 92). Within the boundaries of her present position on the social level, 
Elizabeth cannot seem to grow and express herself naturally. About her wish to become 
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“either a farmer or a doctor” she feels “it was much better to say nothing about it” (MD: 150); 
and though she is “really awfully bored” (MD: 148) by the attention she gets from men, she 
does not demonstrate this boredom the way the essayist expresses her frustration with male 
literary egocentricity, reading Mr A‟s novel and feeling she “must finish the sentence 
somehow [:] But – I am bored!” (AROO: 99).  
Elizabeth has barely initiated her sentence, feeling it to be as “small” and 
“insignificant” as the essayist‟s „fish of thought‟ looks at the start of A Room of One’s Own. 
The essay may be read as marking the stage in the life of Elizabeth where she has the choice 
to walk out of the shadow of the “giant beech tree” and find her own piece of fertile soil 
where people will not wonder “[w]hether that was indeed a tree or a woman walking” (AROO: 
98). This coming out of the shadows, out of the woodwork, as it were, does not mean 
complete disconnection from one‟s origins, one‟s roots. Like “books continue each other” 
(AROO: 79), people are connected through the generations, like buds on the same bough, like 
trees in a forest. These connections make daughters think back through their mothers, make 
every woman writer “the descendant of all those other women whose circumstances [the 
essayist has] been glancing at” (AROO: 80). By thinking back through her mother, by 
engaging in a dialogue with her origins and acknowledging her status as “an inheritor as well 
as an originator” (AROO: 107), Elizabeth may arrive at a „language‟, a sentence by which she 
can position herself as she begins to step outside the shadows and gain a fresh perspective on 
the “giant beech tree”, on her mother, and on the social structures that have placed her in the 
poplar tree role. By moving out of the woodwork, but staying within the social, „sane‟ level of 
the garden, Elizabeth can maintain her privacy but express herself intelligibly and 
communicate, representing her new position and expand her sensibility “like a plant newly 
stood in the air”.   
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While it would be farfetched to speculate that Elizabeth will become a writer like 
Mary Beton/Seton/Carmichael, it seems fruitful to read A Room of One’s Own as a step 
further from both Mrs Dalloway and To the Lighthouse as regards Woolf‟s perception of 
creativity, especially in relation to women. Whereas gender norms and class conventions 
appear determining for Clarissa‟s choice of a „secretly aestheticising‟ lifestyle, cultural 
traditions do not stop the slightly younger Lily Briscoe from painting, despite misogynist 
comments that women “can‟t paint, can‟t write” (TTL: 54). And while Sally Seton‟s “vitality 
– she would paint, she would write” (MD: 199) – seems curbed since her youth, the will and 
ability to express this vitality creatively is taken up by her sister in name, Mary Seton, a few 
decades later. The practical accomplishments alongside the development of a new ethical and 
aesthetical sensitivity and sensibility through Woolf‟s novels and essay seem to open up new 
prospects for Elizabeth considering her freedom to express her kind of selfhood.  
The dialogic perspective on human interaction is treated in various ways in the texts, 
but appears to be a common ethical as well as aesthetical fundament in the sense that the most 
productive relations seem to exist between characters who take a step outside the common 
path in terms of sexual and social conventions and open up for the difference of others. In Mrs 
Dalloway we have seen this in the “completely disinterested” companionship between Sally 
and Clarissa, in the mystical bond between Clarissa and Septimus and in the wordless 
communication between Clarissa and the woman in the house opposite hers. These relations 
are experienced mostly from Clarissa‟s perspective, but seem to exemplify Bakhtin‟s idea that 
“a second participant is implicated in the event of self-contemplation, a fictitious other, a 
nonauthoritative and unfounded author” (AA: 33); Clarissa‟s coming to terms with her 
selfhood and her social position is structured as an open exchange with an other.  
Elizabeth, standing on the verge of womanhood, may have yet to „shape‟ her 
“nonauthoritative and unfounded author”. Struggling with her relation to Mrs. Ramsay, Lily 
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Briscoe has been read as finding such a nonauthoritative second participant in Mr. Carmichael; 
perhaps Mary Carmichael/Seton/Beton can provide a model for Elizabeth‟s self-
contemplation? The model of the androgynous mind, that “transmits emotion without 
impediment; that […] is naturally creative, incandescent, and undivided [and that] does not 
think separately of sex” (AROO: 97), may inspire Elizabeth to “devise some entirely new 
combination of her resources, so highly developed for other purposes, so as to absorb the new 
into the old without disturbing the infinitely intricate and elaborate balance of the whole” 
(AROO: 84). The question of balance is a main concern for Lily in her process of painting 
Mrs. Ramsay‟s picture, on which the next chapter will elaborate.  
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Chapter Three 
“Subject and Object and the Nature of Reality”:  
Lily Briscoe’s Relational Aesthetic 
“The artist‟s struggle to achieve a determinate and stable image of the hero is to a 
considerable extent a struggle with himself (AA: 6), Mikhail Bakhtin states in his essay 
“Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”. Throughout To the Lighthouse, the painter Lily 
Briscoe struggles with her picture, constantly feeling that she “must move the tree to the 
middle; that matters – nothing else” (TTL: 94). Trying to express on the canvas her impression 
of Mrs. Ramsay, the matriarch, Lily is filled with confusion and doubt regarding her position 
as an artist and as a woman. Among the guests at the Ramsay summer house in the Hebrides 
around 1911, Lily feels that “staying with the Ramsays, was to be made to feel violently two 
opposite things at the same time; that‟s what you feel, was one; that‟s what I feel was the 
other, and then they fought together in her mind” (TTL: 111).  
 Lily‟s process of painting is made painful by the various kinds of opposition she is met 
with not only by the Ramsays themselves, but also by the other guests, most notably Charles 
Tansley, who repeatedly criticises women, claiming that they “can‟t paint, can‟t write” (TTL: 
54). Her connection and communication with the botanist William Bankes and the poet 
Augustus Carmichael are also significant in Lily‟s coming to an aesthetic, as well as an 
ethical solution to her problem of portraying her hostess and defining her own role as a 
woman and an artist. Lily‟s relationship to Mr. Carmichael has been held out as especially 
interesting and important in terms of artistic outlook and creative processes, leading critics 
such as J. Hillis Miller and Lisa Rado to focus upon Mr. Carmichael as a key character in 
Lily‟s advance towards her artistic vision. They disagree, however, on Mr. Carmichael‟s role 
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as an androgynous figure inspiring Lily‟s vision and her ability to position herself as an 
observer outside the hegemonic heteronormativity represented by the Ramsays. Whatever or 
whomever proves to be more important in her aesthetic vision, it seems apparent that several 
people and perspectives are influential in Lily‟s effort to portray Mrs. Ramsay in her picture. 
This chapter will examine the movement and obstacles of Lily‟s creative process, how she 
compromises to reach a satisfactory position among the others, what enables her to express 
her mental image on the canvas and „moves her to move the tree to the middle‟. The 
following pages will seek to understand Lily‟s struggle with herself by investigating how she 
relates to other characters in To the Lighthouse, Mrs Dalloway and A Room of One’s Own, 
following the methodology and the Bakhtinian approach of the previous chapter and treating 
these relations as indicative of a dialogical understanding of creativity. Whereas none of the 
characters in Mrs Dalloway are actually artists with an outspoken, specifically aesthetic 
agenda, Lily Briscoe is presented as a protagonist, a painter whose artistic vision is a central 
concern throughout the whole novel, suggesting that it be read as a meta-narrative. It seems 
natural to read her aesthetic effort into the context of androgyny as it is conveyed in A Room 
of One’s Own, and to see how Lily‟s painterly project anticipates the essay‟s ideal of 
androgynous writing. The next pages will explore whether Lily could be said to embody the 
androgynous mind and how her aesthetic activity relates to the “rhythmical order” (AROO: 95) 
of the androgynous vision as it is presented in A Room of One’s Own. 
 Before I introduce the readings by Miller and Rado, I find it pertinent to explain my 
utilisation of them in this chapter. In order to explore the possibilities of a Bakhtinian 
perspective here, I present their diverging views as two established perspectives against which 
my own reading must position itself. Thereby I can show how my understanding displaces 
Miller and Rado‟s, giving space to a different, hopefully productive approach. My usage of 
their critical responses is thus somewhat argumentative and pedagogical, and does not aim to 
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fully account for the complexity of their conceptions. With this as a premise I hope to 
demonstrate how a Bakhtinian view opens up for another perspective and new possibilities as 
regards Woolf‟s concept of creativity in To the Lighthouse.      
Miller positions Lily‟s rhythm of creativity as one among three others; those of Mrs. 
Ramsay, Mr. Ramsay and Mr. Carmichael. He reads Woolf‟s novel as a “question of whether 
there is beneath the manifold human activities of doing, thinking, talking, writing, creating, a 
rhythmical groundswell which is comforting and sustaining”; which might be associated with 
the vagrant‟s fertile song in Mrs Dalloway, “soaking through the knotted roots of infinite ages” 
(MD: 89) and sung in “the voice of an ancient spring spouting from the earth” (MD: 88) 
which seems to connect people‟s minds; “or whether such rhythm as there is outside human 
constructing beats out no more than the measure of approaching death” (Miller 1990: 152). 
The latter may be linked to the sound of Big Ben as a signifier of Mr. Bradshaw‟s clockwork 
rationality of “Proportion” and “Conversion” which seems not only unproductive but 
destructive to human relations. 
The characters‟ different ways of investigating this question of creative rhythm, their 
efforts of “rhythmic extrapolation out into the future” (Miller 1990: 155), vary in terms of 
aims and success. Mrs. Ramsay dies suddenly after several years of nurturing and party-
giving; Mr. Ramsay‟s orderly reasoning mind can never get him past Q. During Lily‟s last 
strokes on her painting, Miller claims, she seems overtaken by some rhythmic mental 
choreography, whether this movement is founded on some “principle outside itself, or 
whether its power is merely intrinsic, the imposition of a pulsating formal pattern on a 
formless background” (Miller 1990: 154).  
The most successful creative mode in To the Lighthouse Miller finds in Mr. 
Carmichael‟s “covert, muted, obscure” (Miller 1990: 154) poetry writing. The fact that Mr. 
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Carmichael is “never or scarcely ever presented from the inside by way of that indirect 
discourse, the consciousness of the narrator married to the consciousness of the character and 
speaking for it” (Miller 1990: 154-155), makes Miller suspect a special relationship, an 
aesthetic alliance between Mr. Carmichael and the narrator. Mr. Carmichael‟s poetry is 
described as slow, sonorous and impersonal, in Miller‟s view establishing a link with “the 
narrator‟s impersonal voice [which] transforms everything into pastness and sees everything 
from the perspective of death” (Miller 1990: 160). Rather than depending on the different 
characters for its existence, the narrator‟s voice is heard also in the mid section, in which there 
are no human minds to penetrate and describe the world through. The narrator‟s perspective 
thus seems to point to Mr. Ramsay‟s attempt to “[t]hink of a kitchen table [...] when you‟re 
not there” (TTL: 28); whoever or whatever is narrating, he, she or it does not need the 
presence of humans to tell the story of the decaying summer house. The narrative mind, 
however, “an inhuman witness of the universal dissolution” (Miller 1990: 162), speaks in a 
voice and a language personifying the inanimate surroundings to such a degree that Miller 
suggests “that the narrator of To the Lighthouse is not a ubiquitous mind but language itself” 
(Miller 1990: 163), animating objects so that “[w]herever there is language there will be 
personality somewhere”. The inherently personifying quality of language makes Mr. 
Ramsay‟s „kitchen table project‟ impossible, as “there is no thinking without language” 
(Miller 1990: 164), without some „I‟, some „you‟, some „he‟, „she‟ or „it‟. 
Miller goes on to ask which of these personal pronouns would suit the narrator of To 
the Lighthouse, referring to Woolf‟s raising of the questions of androgyny and sexual 
language in A Room of One’s Own. The artistic status she has given Augustus Carmichael in 
the novel and Mary Carmichael in the essay leads Miller to ask if they are not aesthetically 
related as father and daughter. If To the Lighthouse in any way anticipates A Room of One’s 
Own, it is in the sense of rhythm and how this varies along the lines of sex and gender, and 
 
 
59 
 
Woolf‟s main point, in Miller‟s view, “is that the rhythm of male style does not fit [the 
woman writer‟s] natural stylistic stride and pace” (Miller 1990: 165). Miller reads Woolf‟s 
concept of creativity as distinguishing between two rhythmic modes: a male, solar, constative 
conception of rhythm claiming to reaffirm “a pattern already present outside the writing” 
(Miller 1990: 167), as opposed to a female, lunar and “extrapolative, performative” rhythm; 
not “measured by its truth of correspondence to any pre-existing pattern”, this is writing 
“beyond or outside the egotistic illusions of „phallogocentrism‟, that erect male letter „I‟ 
shadowing and killing everything” (Miller 1990: 168). The female style of writing, knowing 
“there is no truth, no rhythm but the drumbeat of death” and thus, with its hesitant rhythm 
being “in resonance with the truth that there is no truth”, is the truly constative mode in 
relation to the male style, “unwittingly performative” (Miller 1990: 168) through its false 
claim to be affirmative of „the truth‟. Miller then reads the concept of an androgynous style as 
an ideal mode of writing which combines the performative and the constative modes in an 
expression of a “fundamental undecidability [...] of what would constitute valid rhythms of 
style” (Miller 1990: 168). This is also, Miller claims, what the narration of To the Lighthouse 
does, expressing a mind that “is fertilized by the presence of a man in it” (Miller 1990: 169), 
granting Mr. Carmichael and Lily Briscoe creative power in a “constantly reversing rhythm, 
affirming itself and at the same time interrupting itself” (Miller 1990: 169).  
Lisa Rado understands Woolfian androgyny differently, reading it as a less dynamic 
concept and even a dead end in both personal and creative concerns, as on the one hand it 
affirms the subject and “promises the possibility of virtually unlimited empowerment and 
inspiration, on the other hand, the model of an androgyne imagination at the same time 
threatens to annihilate the self from which it has been generated” (Rado 20). Rado‟s main 
problem with Miller‟s reading of Woolf, however, is his assumption of masculinity and 
femininity as “abstractly benign” components, as well as his ignorance of “the desperate 
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cultural motivation behind the desire for and the image of the androgyne” (Rado 156). For 
Rado, it is Lily‟s confrontation with Mrs. Ramsay‟s “paternalistic maternalism” (Rado 155), 
as well as her identification with and incorporation of the phallus into her creative process, 
that enables her to finish her painting and define her position as a woman artist. Having 
incorporated the threat of phallic presence she gains “the transportive empowerment of the 
sublime”; however, she also represses and loses consciousness of “her body, her femaleness, 
her sexual identity” (Rado 155).  
Like Miller, Rado thinks Mr. Carmichael an important part of Lily‟s advance towards 
her vision; he is calm, content and impersonal, “seemingly unaffected by the often stifling 
demands of patriarchal society” (Rado 157), and he offers to Lily “the possibility of 
inhabiting a different subject position and of thereby attaining a protective and empowering 
creative perspective” (Rado 158). A product of a culturally specific moment in which the third 
sex was hailed as transgressing sexual and artistic limits, and thus offering Woolf “a possible 
solution to her painful crisis of authority” (Rado 157), Mr. Carmichael inspires Lily to 
embrace her role as an observer and outsider of patriarchal heteronormativity and transform 
her confrontation with it into a work of art. Coming forward as a divine muse for Lily, Mr. 
Carmichael dissolves the “male poet-female muse dyad and the patriarchal politics on which 
it is based” (Rado 159). Rado argues, however, that Woolf remains unsure of the validity of 
the androgyne as a saviour and preserver of artistic authority and authorship. She detects 
Woolf‟s ambivalence in the narrator‟s apparently ironic description of Mr. Carmichael‟s 
divine attributes; “looking like an old pagan god, shaggy, with weeds in his hair and the 
trident (it was only a French novel) in his hand” (TTL: 225). This shows Woolf‟s uncertainty 
towards “the transcendent quality of Lily‟s vision”, Rado claims, suggesting that Lily merely 
replaces one kind of tyranny with another, escaping from “her sexuality and her female body” 
(Rado 160) and repressing her identity.  
 
 
61 
 
Miller and Rado represent radically different understandings of Woolf and her concept 
of androgyny, with strong implications for their readings of To the Lighthouse as an 
anticipation of A Room of One’s Own. Whereas Miller stresses language and rhythm as 
essential parts of ideal androgynous writing, Rado puts emphasis on the specifically cultural 
aspect of androgyny and the androgyne figure as a way out of the increasing crisis of 
authorship at a particular moment in literary history. Miller understands the androgynous style 
of writing as an acknowledgement of the unconscious performativity inherent in language, 
while Rado explains the androgyne imagination as a conscious choice and, in fact, a desperate 
wish to gain a substantive subjectivity and authority of authorship in a fractured world. What 
their readings have in common, however, is the extraordinary role they ascribe to Mr. 
Carmichael as a catalyst in Lily‟s final stage of painting Mrs. Ramsay. Taking his powerful 
impact on Lily as a premise for their discussion, Miller sees Mr. Carmichael‟s position as a 
fertilising male, constative influence inside Lily‟s mind, whereas Rado reads his role as an 
alternative to Mrs. Ramsay‟s “phallic presence” (Rado 154).  
I think they both raise interesting issues for the debate on Woolfian androgyny; 
Miller‟s idea of Mr. Carmichael‟s resembling the narrating voice as a reflection of language 
and the construction of the novel is thought-provoking, and Rado introduces contextualisation 
to the largely feminist debate on androgyny. However, I find both Miller and Rado to 
undermine their arguments by ultimately conceiving of androgyny as a dyadic unity in which 
Mr. Carmichael‟s role is elevated to the position as Lily‟s sole other, or author. Despite his 
unconventional behaviour and uncertain sexual nature, he contains some male stylistic 
element that protrudes into Lily‟s female consciousness, as far as Miller and Rado are 
concerned. Representing a poststructuralist perspective, Miller holds the androgynous style of 
writing, combining constative and performative modes of creating, as open to everyone and 
not bound to a specific sex or gender. Yet, he insists that “there are two possible concepts of 
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rhythm” in writing; a male and a female, unequivocally tied to the duality of constative and 
performative respectively. While criticising the constative mode for claiming to “reaffirm, to 
echo, a pattern already outside the writing” (Miller 1990: 167), Miller seems to do this in his 
own reading. The performative mode, described as “a way of doing things with words that is 
not to be measured by its truth of correspondence to any pre-existing pattern” (Miller 1990: 
168), fits in well with the deconstructionist view of language as a relative and arbitrary 
structure of meaning that „performs‟ itself over and over again. He refers to Derrida, the 
„father‟ of deconstruction, and his wish to “write like (a) woman” (Miller 1990: 165) to 
validate his idea that writing performatively is “to write beyond or outside the egotistic 
illusions of „phallogocentrism‟” (Miller 1990: 168), and holds this as superior to the 
constative, male way of writing. The distinction he makes between constative and 
performative seems correspondent to the Kristevan symbolic and the semiotic orders as 
complementary dimensions and modes of communication. Favouring the 
semiotic/performative/female mode, Miller further underscores his tendency to seek 
affirmation in a deconstructionist “pattern already outside the writing” (Miller 1990: 167). He 
may thus be said to fall victim to his own aesthetical critique. The problem is not so much the 
specific associative lines he draws between mode and gender, as his definition of the 
androgynous style as a combination of two naturally distinct qualities. This hierarchical 
dichotomy in which the female mode is idealised seems limiting to Woolf‟s understanding of 
androgyny.  
Some of the same can be said for Rado‟s reading, although she criticises Miller for 
conceiving of androgyny as a “union of abstractly benign masculine and feminine 
components” (Rado 156). Still, even though she sees Mr. Carmichael as representing a third 
sex alternative, Rado too understands the dynamics of Lily‟s vision as a dyadic process in 
which the male presence is elevated to something sublime with whom Lily can identify, thus 
 
 
63 
 
repressing her female identity. Thus, strangely enough, considering Miller and Rado‟s 
deconstructionist and historicist perspectives respectively, they both end up expressing 
ultimately binary understandings of Woolfian androgyny and a schematic conception of Lily‟s 
relation to Mr. Carmichael.  
These views appear to me too rigidly tied to the sexual dichotomy which is the 
etymological basis of the notion of androgyny (OED). Woolfian androgyny presented in a 
Bakhtinian light may open up its potential beyond the gender binary which seems so often to 
be the foundation as well as the final outcome of other theoretical approaches to the concept. 
The point of departure for my reading of Lily‟s painting process is the idea that Woolf‟s level 
of ambition transcends the dyadic unity of masculine and feminine elements that some critics 
believe her concept to represent. With reference to Bakhtin, the androgynous vision seems 
irreducible to a model of sexual duality and its potential reaching further as regards the 
concept of creativity as well as the dynamics of Lily‟s aesthetical process and eventual vision.  
Starting out from a wish to paint Mrs. Ramsay sitting with her son James in the 
window, Lily does seek unity with her object of portraiture. Perceiving Mrs. Ramsay in her 
wicker arm chair as a triangular, “dome-shaped hive”, Lily imagines herself as a bee haunting 
the hive, “drawn by some sweetness or sharpness in the air intangible to touch or taste” (TTL: 
58). Lily feels she must define this puzzling “sweetness or sharpness” and gain complete 
knowledge of Mrs. Ramsay‟s interior in order to portray her truthfully as a part of her painting. 
She wonders: “What art was there, known to love or cunning, by which one pressed through 
into those secret chambers? What device for becoming, like waters poured into one jar, 
inextricably the same, one with the object one adored?” (TTL: 57). Lily‟s choice of words 
here seems to touch upon a central issue of Bakhtin‟s architectonics, that is the foundational 
perceptual distinction between subject and object and the conditions this sets for people‟s 
knowledge of each other as well as themselves. The wish to achieve a whole out of disparate 
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parts Bakhtin understands as deeply human and both a consequence of and a premise for the 
dialogical relation between the self and the other, which he treats as the aesthetic activity 
taking place between an author and his or her “hero”. Dialogue acknowledges the generality 
of subjectivity, the interchangeability and simultaneity of the subject/object relation; we all 
occupy a unique subjective position, but as subjects we are also made objects from the 
perspective of others. The “art” of knowing an other begins with the self‟s projecting itself 
into the other and experiencing his/her life from within him/her (AA: 25). The aim of this 
projection, however, is not for the subject and the object to become “inextricably the same”; 
rather than an “absolute consciousness, a consciousness that has nothing transgredient to itself” 
(AA: 20); the self and the other engage in a whole in which neither is determinate nor 
reducible to a single position. The self/other construct entails a dynamic capacity which is 
based on the simultaneous plurality of the parts rather than their solitary singularity. „I‟ and 
„you‟ are not solitary, but solidary, and are mutually inclusive rather than mutually exclusive. 
In the light of these ideas Lily‟s wish to unite with her object or „hero‟ by pressing into 
Mrs. Ramsay‟s “secret chambers” seems both misleading and impossible. Her idea of unity 
presents itself as more complicated, however, as Lily asks if “loving, as people called it, 
[could] make her and Mrs. Ramsay one? for it was not knowledge but unity that she desired, 
not inscriptions on tablets, nothing that could be written in any language known to men, but 
intimacy itself, which is knowledge” (TTL: 57). While expressing an apparently self-
contradictory chain of thought here, Lily‟s perception of “knowledge” may be associated with 
Bakhtin‟s idea of cognition, his term for reflection on experience. In the realm of cognition, 
the difference between the experiencing self and the experiencing of the other is transcended 
or ignored, “just as [cognition] ignores the uniqueness of the cognizing subiectum. In the 
unitary world of cognition, I cannot find a place for myself as a unique I-for-myself in 
distinction to all other human beings [...] as others for me” (AA: 37). It follows that the unitary 
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world of cognition is a sphere which rejects, or suspends the unitary or unique self. Lily, 
however, seems too focussed upon her own subject position and Mrs. Ramsay‟s object status 
as “adored”, as the feminine ideal she is commonly perceived as.  
The way Lily initially seeks knowledge of her object, wishing to enter its interior in 
hope of finding some truth of “the thing itself before it has been made anything” (TTL: 209), 
seems to echo the dyadic view of unity that Miller and Rado read into Woolfian androgyny. It 
also recalls Mr. Ramsay‟s impossible task of imagining a kitchen table “when you‟re not 
there”. This attitude to “[s]ubject and object and the nature of reality” (TTL: 28) suggests a 
closing off of self and other into separately fixed positions, of which the privilege of 
“knowledge”, of authorial authority is confined to the self or subject position. This aspect is 
pointed out by Rado, emphasising the self‟s repression and forceful incorporation of an other 
in order to gain creative empowerment. However, Lily does not lock herself to a 
misconceived subjectivity, and unlike Mr. Ramsay she does not turn inwards in an attempt to 
strengthen and distinguish the ego as an opposition to the other. Moreover, Lily‟s process 
requires her to re-evaluate her perception of Mr. Ramsay in particular, whom she initially sees 
as “tyrannical” and on whom she must keep “looking down, purposely, for only so could she 
keep steady, staying with the Ramsays” (TTL: 52-53). Considering Mr. Ramsay unbearably 
narrow-minded, Lily is confronted with her own narrow view as Mr. Ramsay bows down to 
tie her shoe-laces properly. This scene, expressing at first to Lily a pathetic need for praise 
and personal prestige, spurs on a more dynamic perspective in her as she senses in Mr. 
Ramsay a sudden “interest in ordinary human things” (TTL: 170), a shedding of  
worries and ambitions, and the hope of sympathy and the desire for praise, [as if he] 
had entered some other region, was drawn on, as if by curiosity, in dumb colloquy, 
whether with himself or another, at the head of that little procession out of one‟s range 
(TTL: 170).  
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Lily cannot help projecting herself into his mind, as it were, sensing his doubts about 
the reality of the kitchen table and his consequential need for sympathy from others, above all 
his wife, who has passed away during the war.  This episode, in which Lily is physically 
looking down on the man she has been so intent on categorising as a pitiable tyrant, unsettles 
Lily‟s social „map‟ in which people have their specific positions. The insight she gains into 
Mr. Ramsay‟s needs and the dynamics of “sympathy” leaves Lily feeling “curiously divided, 
as if one part of her were drawn out there”, as Mr. Ramsay and his children depart to go to the 
lighthouse. Also curious is the fact that Lily seems to be presented from Mrs. Ramsay‟s 
perspective as she stands looking towards the lighthouse, “screwing up her little Chinese eyes 
in her small puckered face” (TTL: 171). With Lily‟s feeling of division between the lighthouse 
and the lawn, what she perceives of the latter‟s “hedge with its green cave of blues and 
browns” (TTL: 171) appears associative with Mrs. Ramsay‟s perception of the blue water 
before her, “the hoary Lighthouse, distant, austere, in the midst; and on the right [...] the green 
sand dunes with the wild flowing grasses on them, which always seemed to be running away 
into some moon country, uninhabited of men” (TTL: 17). Mr. Ramsay‟s tying Lily‟s shoes 
seems to be a first step in her “untying the knot in imagination” preventing her from “making 
the first mark” (TTL: 171). Lily‟s return to her canvas and planning of her picture connects to 
Bakhtin‟s idea that  
[a]esthetic activity proper actually begins at the point when we return into ourselves, 
when we return to our own place outside the suffering person, and start to form and 
consummate the material we derived from projecting ourselves into the other and 
experiencing him from within himself (AA: 26). 
Lily‟s aesthetic activity proceeds along with the social dynamics taking place 
especially after Mr. Ramsay takes his leave bound for the lighthouse. Thinking that “so much 
depends upon distance: whether people are near us or far from us” (TTL: 207), Lily 
acknowledges the positionality of the subject/object relation. Rather than locking herself in a 
solipsistic artist subject role, she realises the “human being‟s absolute need for the other, for 
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the other‟s seeing, remembering, gathering, and unifying self-activity” (AA: 35-36). Moreover, 
her „interior dialogue‟ with people around her suggests that not only “a second participant is 
implicated in the event of self-contemplation” (AA: 33), but also a third, a fourth, and so on. 
Lily‟s aesthetical process seems to show that the subject/object relation is more complex than 
a dyadic unity; rather than a scheme for the distribution of qualities or roles in what Bakhtin 
denotes an aesthetic event (AA: 20), the connection between author and hero or self and other 
functions as a premise for a much more heterogeneous and open way of interacting and 
creating. Lily‟s understanding of her subjectivity develops to becoming more flexible and 
dynamic as she lets other voices “penetrate within” (AROO: 101) her mind, thereby arriving at 
a polyphonic perception of “subject and object and the nature of reality”.  
Significant to this arrival seems Lily‟s change of perspective; from focussing on the 
window, trying to revivify Mrs. Ramsay whose triangular shape no longer throws a shadow 
on the steps, Lily turns her eyes upon the lighthouse, which Mrs. Ramsay did ten years before, 
and the Ramsays‟ boat sailing towards it. As the boat reaches the middle of the bay, 
“everybody seemed to come very close together and to feel each other‟s presence, which they 
had almost forgotten” (TTL: 199). These words may recall Clarissa Dalloway‟s feeling that 
“on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other, 
she being part [...] of the trees at home [...] part of people she had never met” (MD: 8-9), 
implying co-dependency and co-authoring as essential qualities of human existence. Lily also 
seems to follow Clarissa‟s idea that to know “any one, one must seek out the people who 
completed them” (MD: 167), as she projects herself into the experience of the people 
surrounding Mrs. Ramsay, feeling that “[f]ifty pairs of eyes were not enough to get around 
that one woman with”, and that “[a]mong them, must be one that was stone blind to her 
beauty” (TTL: 214).  
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This she finds in Mr. Carmichael, whose wanting “very little of other people” (TTL: 
211) rather upsets Mrs. Ramsay. Through his „blind eye‟ to Mrs. Ramsay‟s beauty, Lily 
seems to be able to enter the “dome-shaped hive” that she has longed to unite with; she “felt 
as if a door had opened, and one went in and stood gazing silently about in a high cathedral-
like place” (TTL: 186). In a moment which “seemed extraordinarily fertile”, questions flash 
up in Lily‟s dialogue with Mrs. Ramsay: “Who knows what we are, what we feel? Who 
knows even at the moment of intimacy, This is knowledge? Aren‟t things spoilt then, Mrs. 
Ramsay may have asked [...] by saying them?” (TTL: 187). While Lily has walked through an 
open door rather than “pressed through into those secret chambers” of Mrs. Ramsay, the 
insight she gains comes in the form of more questions of the intimacy and knowledge she has 
longed for. As Lily steps “back to get her canvas – so – into perspective” (TTL: 187), she 
returns to her own „room‟ and starts to form and consummate the material she derived from 
projecting herself into her object (AA: 26) . Seeking to answer Mrs. Ramsay‟s questions, Lily 
ponders her own “disinterested” relationship with William Bankes, whom she “loved” (TTL: 
192) and with whom she has shared “something profoundly intimate” (TTL: 60). Their 
connection seems to confirm Mrs. Ramsay‟s suggestion that things are “spoilt [...] by saying 
them”, as between Lily and William, “[m]any things were left unsaid” (TTL: 192). This may 
recall Clarissa‟s understanding of Richard‟s love for her without his speaking (MD: 129), and 
also the scene in which Mrs. Ramsay appears to communicate her love for her husband 
without words; “[Mrs. Ramsay] had not said it, but [Mr. Ramsay] knew it” (TTL: 134).  
Nevertheless, when Lily tries to see Mrs. Ramsay “through William‟s eyes” (TTL: 
192), she cannot seem to get past Mrs. Ramsay‟s “cover of beauty” (TTL: 193). Turning to Mr. 
Carmichael, whose eyes seem “to reflect the branches moving or the clouds passing, but to 
give no inkling of any inner thoughts or emotion whatsoever, if he wanted anything” (TTL: 
14), Lily is struck with the physical absence of Mrs. Ramsay and her shadow on the steps. She 
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ponders how her memory of Mrs. Ramsay has presented her as a “[g]host, air, nothingness, a 
thing you could play with easily and safely at any time”. Her idea that “the whole wave and 
whisper of the garden became like curves and arabesques flourishing round a centre of 
complete emptiness” (TTL: 194) appears as a reminder of the meaning of distance and 
absence for human relations and interaction. Musing on the “unreality” felt in the early 
morning or after “coming back from a journey [...] before habits had spun themselves across 
the surface” and without “the usual chatter”, Lily ponders how one “glided, one shook one‟s 
sails (there was a good deal of movement in the bay, boats were starting off) between things, 
beyond things. Empty it was not, but full to the brim”. Lily feels she is moving and floating in 
some substance into which  
had spilled so many lives. The Ramsays‟; the children‟s; and all sorts of waifs and 
strays of things besides. A washerwoman with her basket; a rook; a red-hot poker; the 
purples and grey-greens of flowers: some common feeling which held the whole 
together (TTL: 208). 
Lily‟s thoughts here seem to echo Clarissa‟s sensing odd affinities “with people she had never 
spoken to, some woman in the street, some man behind the counter – even trees”. Clarissa‟s 
idea that “since our apparitions [...] are so momentary compared with the other, the unseen 
part of us, which spreads wide, the unseen might survive, be recovered somehow attached to 
this person or that, or even haunting certain places, after death”, also seems relevant and 
related to Lily‟s pondering on Mrs. Ramsay‟s role after she is gone.  
Lily‟s feeling of gliding “between things, beyond things” expresses the idea that 
„meaning‟ is produced in the spaces between people rather than within people. Thus, when 
Lily projects herself into Mrs. Ramsay‟s mind, what she finds echoes rather than answers the 
questions she started out with. It is on the “journey” back to her own point of view that Lily 
needs to become aware of the “unseen” space between them and fill “this silence, this 
emptiness” (TTL: 208) there with a „voice‟ and a meaning, though not necessarily through 
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words. This points to the empty canvas on which Lily struggles to express some “relations of 
masses” (TTL: 59), implying a relational aesthetic which may be said to resemble Bakhtin‟s 
dialogical principle. Watching the Ramsays‟ boat sailing towards the lighthouse, Lily cannot 
seem to “achieve that razor edge of balance between two opposite forces; Mr. Ramsay and the 
picture; which was necessary” (TTL: 209). The seemingly dualistic opposition really 
represents the heterogeneity of the aesthetic event; as the boat draws nearer to the lighthouse 
and further away from Lily‟s empty canvas the meanings of distance, perspective and the 
limits of perception and subjectivity present themselves in a complex web of dialogue. As 
Lily‟s divided mind, partly projected into Mr. Ramsay‟s, stretches out to encompass the 
perspective from the lighthouse at which the boat is about to arrive, their „opposite‟ 
perspectives on the lighthouse are joined, reflecting the way Mrs. Ramsay and Mr. 
Carmichael‟s perceptions of a fruit bowl build up its image at the same time as they co-author 
each other; “looking together united them” (TTL: 106).  
In the same way, the lighthouse is consummated by a range of different and changing 
perspectives throughout the novel. Mrs. Ramsay, for example, sees it as “hoary [...] distant, 
austere”, echoing Lily‟s image of the kitchen table seen through Mr. Ramsay‟s eyes as 
“visionary, austere” (TTL: 170). The objective truth of the kitchen table, however, is not just 
“intangible” like Mrs. Ramsay‟s mysterious “sweetness” which Lily tries to define through 
her picture; it simply does not exist. Nothing is a “thing in itself”, and thus the lighthouse is 
also semiotically multitudinous and simultaneous. James, approaching the lighthouse by boat 
and confused by his seemingly contradictory perceptions of it as both “silvery, misty-looking 
tower” (TTL: 202) and a “stark tower on a bare rock” (TTL: 220), wonders which is the right 
one: “So that was the Lighthouse, was it? No, the other was also the Lighthouse. For nothing 
was simply one thing” (TTL: 202). These thoughts attribute an enormous potential to the bay 
as a mediating space, of the sea as an “unfathomably deep” infinity of possible perspectives. 
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When Lily‟s consciousness seems to stretch across the bay with Mr. Ramsay all the way to 
the lighthouse, she experiences herself as “encompassing any boundaries, any body – by 
extending [her]self beyond any bounds” (AA: 40). Lily‟s subject position requires her to 
adjust her point of view with the movement of Mr. Ramsay, whose  
outward, delimited existence takes on the character of an axiologically resilient and 
heavy, inwardly weighty, material for shaping and sculpting the given human being – 
not as a physically delimited space, but as an aesthetically closed and delimited space 
– as a living space that has the character of an aesthetic event (AA: 42).  
 The aesthetic event of Lily‟s painting treats the sea, the fleeting dimension of human 
relations as a living space in which the subject is exposed to all its possibilities, but also all its 
doubts and insecurities. This relation to the sea is also found in Clarissa‟s sense of “being out, 
out, far out to sea and alone; she always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to 
live even one day” (MD: 9). Lily appears to echo her thoughts as she contemplates the “odd 
road” of painting: “Out and out one went, further and further, until at last one seemed to be on 
a narrow plank, perfectly alone, over the sea” (TTL: 187). To prepare for painting and 
aesthetic activity is to expose the mind to a sea of “innumerable risks” which “must be run; 
the mark made” (TTL: 172) through a hazardous process: 
Always (it was in her nature, or in her sex, she did not know which) before she 
exchanged the fluidity of life for the concentration of painting she had a few moments 
of nakedness when she seemed like an unborn soul, a soul reft of body, hesitating on 
some windy pinnacle and exposed without protection to all the blasts of doubt (TTL: 
173). 
Lily raises the question herself of whether her creative urges and obstacles are grounded in 
her being female or not. After she makes the first mark with “a curious physical sensation” 
(TTL: 172), her painting process is described in bodily imagery that has often been read as 
overtly sexual. Lily‟s experience of a looming mass protruding, “pressing on her eyeballs” 
and starting “the lubrication of her faculties” (TTL: 173) has led critics such as Rado to see 
Lily‟s mind as “a phallus, her creativity as an ejaculative, lubricating fountain” (Rado 155). 
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Miller reads Lily‟s painting as an expression of a female mind fertilised by the, albeit 
alternative, male presence of Mr. Carmichael. Both critics read Lily‟s course of creation as 
exemplifying the sexual dyad they understand Woolfian androgyny as in A Room of One’s 
Own: “Some collaboration has to take place in the mind between the woman and the man 
before the art of creation can be accomplished” (TTL: 103). The road seems short from this 
statement to the deduction of artistic androgyny as a mental state balancing specifically 
masculine and feminine qualities. The essayist claims, however, that the “fully developed”, 
creative mind “does not think separately of sex” (AROO: 97), and that “it is fatal for anyone 
who writes to think of their sex. It is fatal to be a man or a woman pure and simple; one must 
be woman-manly or man-womanly” (AROO: 102). While Lily does seem to think of “sex” as 
a separate personal factor, she is far from certain that it determines one‟s creative abilities. 
During her “concentration of painting”, Lily forgets her sex, losing “consciousness of outer 
things, and her name and her personality and her appearance, and whether Mr. Carmichael 
was there or not” (TTL: 174). Her lack of sexual self-consciousness seems to correspond to 
Mary Carmichael‟s writing “as a woman, but as a woman who has forgotten that she is a 
woman, so that her pages were full of that curious sexual quality which comes only when sex 
is unconscious of itself” (AROO: 92).  
 In the light of the essay‟s apparent focus on the sexual aspect of creativity, describing 
the artistic mind as a collaboration of masculine and feminine, it may be tempting to 
understand Lily‟s „lubricated faculties‟ as significant of a “curious sexual quality” based on 
gender opposites. Thinking of the body as primarily sexed and reading the bodily imagery of 
Lily‟s process as sexual, however, may reduce her vision to a struggle to gain a gendered 
body for her naked soul. Reading Woolf‟s aesthetic androgyny and Lily‟s artistic vision in a 
Bakhtinian light, seeing the collaboration within the mind between male and female as 
metaphorical of the perceptually based self/other relation, greatly expands the validity and 
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productive potential of the Woolfian concept of creativity. Within this frame of thought, the 
soul‟s birth takes place on a different level than the sexual. From hesitating naked, “alone, 
over the sea”, the “unborn soul” must dive into the open ocean of possible perspectives, in 
order to be bodied and able to position itself according to other bodied souls. To dive into this 
sea is to dispense with one‟s need for a fixed subjective perspective and to acknowledge the 
interchangeable relation that the self has to the other. The self‟s recognition of this relation is 
a realisation of the other‟s otherness and the self‟s reciprocal position. This positionality 
requires the self and the other to be realised, to be bodied on a relational level that goes 
beyond the sexual. 
 In order to position herself as a creative subject, Lily must treat Mrs. Ramsay 
dialogically as an other instead of playing with her monologically as a “[g]host, air, 
nothingness”, as what Bakhtin calls “a soul without a place of its own [...] a participant 
without a name and without a role – something absolutely extrahistorical” (AA: 32). For Lily‟s 
“soul reft of body” to become a whole, a self, she must dare to lose the safe distance at which 
she has kept her „heroine‟, and the “screen of the other‟s living reaction must be bodied and 
given a founded, essential, authoritative independence and self-sufficiency: it must be made 
into an answerable author” (AA: 32). The „authorisation‟ of Mrs. Ramsay‟s otherness is also 
the „materialisation‟ of her memory by which Lily grants her communicative power in a 
dialogical, “living space”. Acknowledging Bakhtin‟s idea that “aesthetic memory is 
productive” (AA: 36), she feels that the articulation of Mrs. Ramsay‟s absence requires her to 
“be on a level with ordinary experience, to feel simply that‟s a chair, that‟s a table, and yet at 
the same time, It‟s a miracle, it‟s an ecstasy” (TTL: 218). This is the level at which Lily can 
project herself into Mr. Ramsay and meet him in dialogue; recovering an “interest in ordinary 
human things”, Mr. Ramsay is able to stretch his “range” the way Lily does hers and enter 
their “colloquy” (TTL: 170). Lily‟s perception of the connection and simultaneity of the 
 
 
74 
 
ordinary and the miraculous also recalls James‟s perception of the complexity of the 
lighthouse as both mystic and misty and “stark and straight” (TTL: 202). 
Dialogue allows memories to become “part of ordinary experience” (TTL: 219). 
Granting others communicative co-authorship affects not only one‟s view of oneself, but also 
of other people. Thinking of Charles Tansley‟s comments that “women can‟t paint, can‟t write” 
(TTL: 174), Lily remembers their playing ducks and drakes on the beach, watched by Mrs. 
Ramsay, whose presence seems to present Mr. Tansley in such a novel light to Lily that she 
has to “re-fashion her memory of him, and it stayed in the mind almost like a work of art”. 
Lily‟s newfound look on people through dialogue with others makes her feel content that “the 
great revelation” (TTL: 175) of the meaning of life might never come: “Instead there were 
little daily miracles, illuminations, matches struck unexpectedly in the dark” (TTL: 176). One 
is reminded of Clarissa‟s imagining “an illumination; a match burning in a crocus; an inner 
meaning almost expressed” (MD: 35) in a momentous revelation breaking up the flow of 
everyday life. Lily‟s thought of the suddenly, unexpectedly lit match also contrasts with 
Charlotte Brontë‟s unproductive writing as presented by the essayist in A Room of One’s Own: 
“She is like a person striking a match that will not light” (AROO: 80).  
Productive writing and painting seems based on the dialogical self/other relation as a 
premise for a polyphonic perspective making up and turning the empty space of the canvas 
into a “living space”. Lily‟s realisation of dialogue as a “necessary principle” spurs on the 
process in which her mind “kept throwing up from its depths, scenes, and names, and sayings, 
and memories and ideas, like a fountain spurting over that glaring, hideously difficult white 
space” (TTL: 174). The necessity of this is indicated by her following a “rhythm which was 
dictated to her” (TTL: 173) in a dancing movement. Having dared to bare her mind “wide 
open” Lily communicates her “experience with perfect fullness” (AROO: 103) in a selfless, 
unconscious manner which echoes Bakhtin‟s idea that the artist sees her “own creating only in 
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the object to which [s]he is giving form, that is, [s]he sees only the emerging product of 
creation and not the inner, psychologically determinate, process of creation” (AA: 6). Thus, 
“the process of creation is altogether in the product created, and the artist has nothing left to 
do but to refer us to the work [s]he has produced” (AA: 7). 
This is what Lily does, referring to her painting after she has finished it with a line in 
the middle; “I have had my vision” (TTL: 226). Her last stroke marks her successful subject 
position by which she is able to create. For the completion of her picture she has solved the 
opposition of “what you feel” and “what I feel” by realising the interchangeability of the 
self/other relation with its inherent dialogical necessity and polyphonic potential. Lily‟s work 
of art is a recognition of “how „you‟ and „I‟ and „she‟ pass and vanish; nothing stays; all 
changes; but not words, not paint”. She thinks, “not of that actual picture, perhaps, but of what 
it attempted, that it „remained for ever‟” (TTL: 195). Her validation of her work measures not 
the painted canvas itself, but the degree to which her “concentration of painting” is true to her 
vision, feeling that she has succeeded in building “up out of the fleeting and the personal the 
lasting edifice which remains unthrown” (AROO: 92). This is not to say that Lily has 
positioned herself aesthetically once and for all; the “relations of masses” are always moving 
and changing, meaning dissolves and people pass away, requiring the artist to recreate these 
relations according to the “eternal passing and flowing” (TTL: 176) of reality. A “determinate 
and stable image of the hero” is achievable only through recognition of the hero‟s dialogical 
and positional relation to the artist herself, meaning that Lily‟s “vision must be perpetually 
remade” (TTL: 197).  
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Conclusion 
The last chapter of A Room of One’s Own opens by discussing how the notion of sexual 
distinctions may disrupt some mental unity necessary for the act of creation, before the 
speaker goes on to ask, “[w]hat does one mean by „the unity of the mind‟?” (AROO: 95). 
While the essayist refers to the androgynous unity of the individual mind here, the previous 
discussion has shown the need for the self to go into dialogue and projecting itself into an 
other before returning to its own position. Thus, the essayist‟s question may be seen as a 
return to the question haunting Lily of how to achieve “unity” with Mrs. Ramsay. Lily‟s wish 
to unite with her is a wish to know her inside out, to come as “close as she could get” and 
thereby be able to paint her. She wonders if “loving, as people called it, [could] make her and 
Mrs. Ramsay one?” (TTL: 57). The discussion in the previous chapter explains the “loving” 
and “intimacy” that Lily seeks with her object of painting to be of a non-sexual, anti-binary 
nature. The „closest she can get‟ in the end, the knowledge she gains is of a kind that 
preserves what Clarissa thinks of as “a dignity in people; a solitude; […] and that one must 
respect” (MD: 131). Clarissa further believes that “love and religion would destroy that, 
whatever it was, the privacy of the soul” (MD: 139). Reflecting upon “the supreme mystery” 
of the perceptual difference and division between people, Clarissa muses how “here was one 
room; there another. Did religion solve that, or love?” (MD: 140). The solution of this 
mystery seems to require communication between people‟s own rooms before the individual‟s 
“chambers of the mind” (TTL: 57) can be connected into a creative, androgynous unity.  
 While Lily and Clarissa express divergent comprehensions of “love”, both views may 
be seen in relation to Bakhtin‟s understanding of the term. Bakhtin sees love neither as a 
means for a subject and an object to becoming “inextricably the same”, nor as a self-serving 
concept destroying people‟s privacy; on the contrary, his idea of love is “inextricably” tied to 
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and a natural extension of the fundamental dialogical self/other relation. The basic perceptual 
division between self and other cannot be transcended, only mediated; “I cannot love myself 
as I love the other”, and so the “emotional-volitional relationship to the other as other – the 
relationship which we call „love‟ and which we are quite incapable of experiencing in relation 
to ourselves” depends upon the parts‟ following the necessary principle of relativity and 
dialogue. Egocentricity contradicts love, as the “egoist acts as if he loved himself, but in 
reality he experiences nothing that resembles love or tenderness for himself; the point is 
precisely that he does not know these feelings at all”. Egotistical self-preservation is an 
essentially anti-aesthetic and unproductive act, “utterly devoid of any loving and cherishing 
elements, any aesthetic elements whatsoever” (AA: 48). „Love‟ in Bakhtin‟s terms would then 
imply not the pressing through, but an opening of doors between the secret “chambers of the 
mind and heart” (TTL: 57).  
This corresponds well with the speaker‟s argument in A Room of One’s Own; her 
typical contemporary, “self-conscious” poet blocks “the fountain of creative energy” (AROO: 
99) by locking himself up in “the male side” of his brain so that “his feelings no longer 
communicated; his mind seemed separated into different chambers; not a sound carried from 
one to the other” (AROO: 100). This dissonant “self-assertive virility” (AROO: 101) contrasts 
sharply with the vagrant‟s “voice bubbling up without direction, vigour, beginning or end [...] 
of no age or sex” (MD: 88), reaching and confronting Rezia and Peter with some deeply 
hidden aspects of their emotions with her song of “love which has lasted a million years”. 
This „love song‟, “soaking through the knotted roots of infinite ages” (MD: 89) and “issuing 
in a tuft of blue smoke among the topmost leaves” (MD: 91), expresses an everlasting, all-
encompassing quality that recalls Septimus‟ idea that people must “not cut down trees” and 
that “[u]niversal love” is “the meaning of the world” (MD: 162). Possibly sounding clichéd in 
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other contexts, „universal love‟ here seems to be what connects each person‟s “unseen part” 
(MD: 167), above or below „ground‟, to another‟s.  
As has been established in the previous two chapters, this “unseen” dimension of 
interweaved relations is often perceived as something “unsaid” (TTL: 192) in Woolf‟s 
character connections, something communicated without words and adding a sense of 
unreality. Clarissa contemplates that each time she gives a party “she had the feeling of being 
something not herself, and that every one was unreal in one way; much more real in another” 
(MD: 187). The “unsaid” or “unreal” level of human existence refers to the open, empty 
spaces between people where dialogue lies latent in the positioning of the self and the other, 
filling the emptiness between them with meaning. This openness between people is a premise 
for the empathy which Bakhtin sees as an essentially aesthetic, creative activity.  
 Lily sees a striking potential in the distance between people, in “this silence, this 
emptiness, and the unreality of the early morning hour [...] before habits had spun themselves 
across the surface”, feeling “something emerge. Life was most vivid then” (TTL: 208). This 
vividness signifies the relational level at which the “ordinary” (TTL: 218) meets the 
miraculous, where the dialogue between the self and the other is realised on what Bakhtin 
calls “a new plane of being” (AA: 36). Part of Lily‟s puzzlement about the Ramsays‟ relation 
is its ability to stir up a fight between “I” and “you” in her mind, yet they seem integrated in 
“the unreal but penetrating and exciting universe which is the world seen through the eyes of 
love”. Even William‟s “gazing at Mrs. Ramsay” inspires her to think of a love “distilled and 
filtered; love that never attempted to clutch its object; but [...] was meant to be spread over the 
world and become part of the human gain” (TTL: 53). This disinterested love reflecting the 
dialogue between self and other acknowledges the “gulf [...] that one must respect” as a 
necessary part of all human relations, indeed, as the open, living, polyphonically potent space 
in which relations are created.  
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The polyphonic, productive potential of the dialogical self/other relation and by 
consequence of love is also expressed in Lily‟s belief that love “had a thousand shapes” (TTL: 
208). The multifaceted nature of human experience that Lily implies, touches upon the 
heterogeneity of meaning and multiplicity of reality that are central aspects of Woolf‟s 
androgynous vision of creativity as it is expressed through the character connections 
discussed in this thesis. The Bakhtinian perspective from which we have read Woolf‟s texts 
has exposed the potential of androgyny to go beyond the mostly feminist critique that this 
thesis negotiates. Moving away from Showalter‟s feminism of difference, Moi‟s 
deconstructionist approach to androgyny as différance and Rado‟s critique of what she 
considers a desperate wish for a solid, sublime subjectivity, this reading has showed how the 
scope of Woolf‟s concept of creativity is enlarged in the light of Bakhtin‟s theory of dialogue.  
The previous chapters have attempted to show how the androgynous mind relates to 
the need for a room of one‟s own and the necessity of dialogue respectively, within and 
between characters. Setting up a dialogue between the ethical and aesthetic efforts of 
Elizabeth Dalloway, Lily Briscoe and Mary Carmichael in particular, it has been the aim of 
the thesis to open a few doors between the “different chambers” of the texts, as it were, and 
let sounds carry from one to the other, without imposing homogeneous unity upon the works 
as a whole. The exciting element and dialogical potential of Woolf‟s texts lie precisely in their 
heterogeneity with respect to perspective and layers of meaning. Indeed, the essayist 
maintains in a statement that some may read as a resignation regarding the need for one‟s own 
room in order to create, that “in a question like this truth is only to be had by laying together 
many varieties of error” (AROO: 104).  
Rather than resigning, rather than saying that each perspective is „wrong in its own 
right‟ and rather than asserting that one point of view is inherently correct, this statement is 
founded upon a definition of truth as consisting of several viewpoints which relate themselves 
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to each other, creating a visionary, aesthetic whole that “must be perpetually remade” (TTL: 
197). Thus, a thesis paper like the present, like any other critical approach, cannot claim to be 
„right‟ or to be exhaustive in any respect; any standpoint is just another for other perspectives 
to orientate themselves against. One can attribute to such a debate “a sense of repetition – of 
one thing falling where another had fallen, and so setting up an echo which chimed in the air 
and made it full of vibrations” (TTL: 215). Paradoxical as it may seem, this repetition brings 
something new to the table and develops the debate, and it appears to me that the discussion 
of Woolf‟s works as a sustained enquiry into the concept of creativity is still vibrant and alive.   
Woolf‟s concept of creative androgyny and Bakhtin‟s dialogical aesthetic express 
impatience with what the essayist calls “this pitting of sex against sex, of quality against 
quality; all this claiming of superiority and imputing of inferiority, belong to the private-
school stage of human existence where there are „sides‟” (AROO: 104). The hierarchy and 
categorisation of qualities work against the androgynous state of mind by which “our relation 
is to the world of reality and not only to the world of men and women” (AROO: 112). Echoing 
her question “[w]hat does one mean by „the unity if the mind‟?” (AROO: 95), the speaker 
ponders the nature of reality itself: 
What is meant by „reality‟? It would seem to be something very erratic, very 
undependable – now to be found in a dusty road, now in a scrap of newspaper in the street, 
now a daffodil in the sun. It lights up a group in a room and stamps some casual saying. It 
overwhelms one walking home beneath the stars and makes the silent world more real than 
the world of speech – and then there it is again in an omnibus in the uproar of Piccadilly. 
Sometimes, too, it seems to dwell in shapes too far away for us to discern what their nature is. 
But whatever it touches, it fixes and makes permanent. This is what remains over when the 
skin of the day has been cast into the hedge; that is what is left of past time and of our loves 
and hates (AROO: 108). 
This definition of “reality” seems full of references to scenes and episodes in Mrs 
Dalloway and To the Lighthouse which have been discussed in the previous chapters as 
momentous revelations of dialogical insight and as steps towards a realised vision of 
creativity. The speaker reminds us here of the sense of people coming together on a relational, 
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„enlightened‟ level at Mrs. Ramsay and Mrs. Dalloway‟s dinner parties. The passage also 
recalls Clarissa and Sally‟s kissing under the stars and Peter‟s brutal interruption as a clash 
between “the silent world” and “the world of speech”. The latter brings associations of 
Clarissa‟s “unseen” bond to Septimus and the lady living across the street, and it certainly 
connects to Lily and Mr. Carmichael‟s sharing thoughts, though barely speaking, on the lawn 
outside the summerhouse. The essayist seems to have Clarissa in mind as she “stood for a 
moment, looking at the omnibuses in Piccadilly. She would not say of any one in the world 
now that they were this or were that” (MD: 8). While it has been questioned whether Clarissa 
lives up to this statement or ideal in her relation to her daughter, Elizabeth herself, riding the 
bus around London, experiences the “consolatory” effect of the “uproar” (MD: 151), “this 
procession [which] would wrap them all about and carry them on”. She almost escapes 
Clarissa‟s myopic view of her before realising her “mother would not like her to be wandering 
off alone like this” (MD: 152). Lily, on her part, rids herself of her narrow view of Mr. 
Ramsay by getting him and his children at such far a distance that it is difficult for her “to 
discern what their nature is”. Only so can she gather them and Mrs. Ramsay in some 
rearrangement of their relations at the dialogical level that her final stroke on her canvas 
represents. These are all episodes which have a profound, “permanent” effect on the 
characters‟ minds and their relations to each other, marking the dynamics and principles of 
dialogue which it is the writer‟s task to find and collect and “communicate [...] to the rest of 
us” (AROO: 108). 
This task seems fulfilled in Woolf‟s “erratic” collection of moments of reality into a 
dialogic whole signifying a heterogeneous and polyphonic “unity of the mind”. The 
overwhelming amount of criticism of her works in itself says something about the “suggestive 
power” (AROO: 101) they have in readers‟ minds to “give birth to all kinds of other ideas”. 
The dialogical and creative potential of Woolf‟s works presents itself fully when the texts are 
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brought together in a communicative whole which is eternally processional and whose 
androgynous vision “must be perpetually remade”. These are characteristics qualifying A 
Room of One’s Own, Mrs Dalloway and To the Lighthouse as the “sort of writing of which 
one can say that it has the secret of perpetual life” (AROO: 100).  
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